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ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT: THE NEED FOR A 
FULLY DEVELOPED AND COMPREHENSIVE SET OF 
STATUTORY DEFAULT LEGAL RULES 
 
JACK M. GRAVES* 
 
ABSTRACT  
 
This Article analyzes the United States Federal Arbitration Act, as a 
statutory framework for effective arbitration of contract disputes. While 
arbitration under this Act has been subject to ever increasing criticism and 
calls for reform on a variety of fronts—most often from the perspective of 
consumer or employment arbitration—this Article focuses specifically on 
commercial, business-to-business arbitration and critically evaluates the Act 
as a set of default legal rules governing arbitration as a unique contractual 
business relationship. 
The Article first looks at arbitration from a contractual default rules 
perspective and then employs this perspective to analyze: (1) the existing 
federal statutory scheme; (2) the developing body of federal “common law” 
governing arbitration; (3) the potential impact of state legislation governing 
arbitration; and (4) the use of private rules to govern arbitration. Finally, the 
Article looks at the related doctrines of “competence-competence” and 
separability under U.S. law, specifically focusing on the Supreme Court’s 
recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson. The Article ult-
imately concludes with a call for an entirely new federal statute governing 
both domestic and international commercial business-to-business arbitration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The basic idea of arbitration is deceptively simple. Two or more persons 
choose to resolve their disputes privately, thereby foregoing traditional court 
adjudication. Upon closer examination, of course, we discover that this 
simple theoretical construct often raises a variety of challenging and complex 
issues in its practical application.1 In some cases, these issues may be 
resolved by reference to the parties’ arbitration agreement, which may 
include a designated arbitral institution or a set of specified rules for con-
ducting the arbitration. In many other cases, however, the parties must look 
for answers within the applicable legal framework governing their arbitration 
agreement. 
In the United States, arbitration is largely governed by the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA).2 The FAA governs both domestic3 and international4 
arbitration, though it may, under certain circumstances, give way to or be 
supplemented by state laws governing arbitration.5 In the case of inter-
national commercial arbitration, the FAA also incorporates either the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(New York Convention)6 or the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (Panama Convention).7 This broad legal frame-
work—as a default source of the parties’ rights and obligations under 
domestic and international agreements to arbitrate commercial, business-to-
business disputes—serves as the focus of the Article. 
                                                 
1
 For example, who decides if the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute; how many 
arbitrators are required; what happens if one of the parties refuses to cooperate; how much 
discovery is allowed; what sort of hearing procedures are appropriate; and to what extent the 
arbitrator’s award is subject to any sort of judicial review? 
2
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006). 
3
 Id. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
4
 Id. §§ 201-307 (2006). 
5
 The requirements for choosing state arbitration law are not entirely clear. See generally 
George A. Bermann, Ascertaining the Parties’ Intentions in Arbitral Design, 113 PENN ST. 
L. REV. 1013 (2009) (discussing the application of “generic” choice of law clauses, the scope 
of a state’s arbitration laws, and the interplay between federal and state arbitration law). The 
extent to which the FAA preempts state law remains open to significant unresolved 
questions. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 
393, 407-09 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, FAA Preemeption]. Each of these issues is 
explored more fully. See infra Part II.C. 
6
 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
7
 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 14 
I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention]. 
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As a prelude to an examination of the legal framework governing 
arbitration, it is worth considering briefly the nature of arbitration from a few 
distinctive possible viewpoints. Arbitration, like the proverbial “Elephant” 
examined by the “Blind Men,”8 is many different things to different people—
depending on one’s perspective or the lens through which it is examined. 
For example, many critics focus on arbitration as a waiver of fundamental 
rights, often accomplished with largely unread form contracts.9 One might 
reasonably ask whether arbitration should be highly regulated by mandatory 
rules, lest stronger parties take undue advantage of weaker parties. In fact, 
one might further ask whether ex-ante agreements between such parties 
should be enforced at all.10 
Another lens through which one might view arbitration is that of a 
binding dispute resolution “procedure.” From this perspective, arbitration is 
simply a variation on existing court procedures available for the binding 
resolution of private disputes—one with private judges, perhaps fewer 
formalities, and less post-decisional review, but nonetheless a binding dispute 
resolution procedure that in many ways resembles court adjudication. 
From a slightly different perspective, one might view arbitration, not by 
way of comparison to any sort of public adjudication, but instead, as one of 
many alternatives to such binding adjudication commonly described as 
alternative dispute resolution or ADR. From this perspective one might, for 
                                                 
8
 See JOHN GODFREY SAXE, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE POEMS OF JOHN 
GODFREY SAXE 135 (J.R. Osgood ed., 1873). The parable of the blind men and the elephant 
has also been attributed to the Buddha. See also JOSEPH MORRISSEY & JACK GRAVES, 
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW AND ARBITRATION, 299-300 (2008) (employing this analogy to 
introduce the law and practice of arbitration). Professor Park has used this same analogy in 
reference to arbitration, albeit for the purpose of drawing somewhat different distinctions. 
See William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA 
Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 1241, 1242 n.1 (2003) [hereinafter Park, The Specificity of 
International Arbitration]; WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
DISPUTES 222 n.1 (2006). In each case, Professor Park points out a broad variety of legal 
disputes that might be resolved through arbitration. 
9
 See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An 
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 211-12 & nn.2-4 (2000). 
10
 Several scholars have touched on this question. See generally Richard A Bales & Sue 
Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 1081 (2009) (noting that scholars “have not shared the Supreme Court’s endorsement 
of compulsory arbitration”); JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION 
LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127 (2006); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and 
Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between 
Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996). 
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example, consider the differences between binding arbitration and voluntary 
mediation, conciliation, or other forms of ass isted settlement. 
From an international or transnational perspective, arbitration takes on 
additional benefits and challenges. Parties from different legal cultures, as 
well as private and state entities, often particularly prefer the sort of neutral 
forum provided by arbitration, and arbitral awards are generally easier to 
enforce across national borders.11 However, various national laws governing 
arbitration may differ in ways that affect the nature of the arbitral process. 
Lastly, one might view arbitration as a matter of contract—examining arb-
itration agreements as fully independent and separable consensual agree-
ments, even when contained within broader agreements for goods, services, 
or other contractual rights and obligations. 
Each of these perspectives is of course instructive, and a full under-
standing of arbitration requires some level of understanding of all of them 
(just as a full understanding of the proverbial elephant requires an 
understanding of all of its parts). This Article will focus on arbitration as 
contract—not because this perspective is any more important than any other, 
generally, but because it provides particularly useful insights in evaluating 
the current state of United States law governing commercial arbitration and 
potential proposals for its improvement. Specifically, this Article will focus 
on commercial, business-to-business arbitration and examine the 
effectiveness of the existing American legal framework governing arbitration 
agreements as a unique form of contract. 
While others have explored the contractual nature of commercial 
arbitration, such explorations typically focus on the broad autonomy granted 
to parties in structuring the private dispute resolution mechanism.12 Some-
what less has been written about the law governing commercial arbitration as 
a set of contractual default rules,13 and even less has been written on the need 
                                                 
11
 William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural 
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 656-57 (1989). 
12
 See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model 
of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999) (noting that parties add “customized features” to 
arbitration agreements); Thomas Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract Freedom in the 
Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189 (2003) (explaining  
that freedom of contract is embodied in arbitration agreements); Thomas Stipanowich, 
Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. 
L.J. 383 (2009) (noting the need for “real choice” in arbitration agreements). 
13
 Much of the literature instead focuses on the tension between broad party autonomy 
and various proposals of mandatory rules for the protection of consumers and employees in 
arbitration, and the literature addressing default rules has tended to work around the edges of 
current federal law, as reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act. See generally EDWARD 
BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT (2006) (noting 
230 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW     [Vol. 2:225 
for a singular, comprehensive and systematic treatment of both domestic and 
international commercial arbitration.14 
Originally enacted in 1925, the “venerable” FAA has been subject to 
increasingly frequent critiques and calls for amendment. As suggested above, 
many of these critiques argue for greater protection of perceived “weaker” 
parties, such as consumers and employees, and propose either stronger 
mandatory legal rules protecting such parties or the complete exclusion of 
these parties from the effects of ex-ante arbitration agreements.15 The FAA 
                                                                                                                         
the need for a reformulation of federal arbitration law). 
14
 See, e.g., Jack J. Coe, The Case for the UNCITRAL Model—An Introduction, 4 INT’L 
ARB. NEWS 2, 2-4 (2004); Daniel M. Kolkey, Reflections on the U.S. Statutory Framework 
for International Commercial Arbitrations: Its Scope, Its Shortcomings, and the Advantages 
of U.S. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 491, 534 (1990) 
(calling for revision or replacement of the FAA, but limiting focus to international 
commercial arbitration); see also James M. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration Act: Risks and 
Incongruities Relating to the Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in Domestic and 
International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 3-5 (2005) (calling for replacement of 
the FAA, but focusing specifically on interim and partial awards). 
15
 See, e.g., Margaret Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge? 40 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 147, 189 (2010); Margaret Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535,  548 
(2005). Under most national legal systems, pre-dispute arbitration agreements involving 
consumers, employees, and other highly regulated contractual relationships are invalid and 
unenforceable. See Margaret Moses, Privatized “Justice”, supra; Christopher R. Drahozal, 
New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 54 AM. J. 
COMP. L. SUPP. 233, 253 (2006) [hereinafter Drahozal, New Experiences of International 
Commercial Arbitration]. There is currently legislation before both houses of Congress that 
would achieve a similar result under United States law—rendering pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements invalid and unenforceable with respect to employees, consumers, franchisees, 
civil rights claimants, and other parties whose transactions are statutorily regulated based on 
unequal bargaining power. S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). The 
prospects for passage of the foregoing are uncertain at this time. Congress has, however, 
recently passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), which provides for regulatory oversight and potential 
restriction of arbitration of financial disputes involving consumers. See Karen Halverson 
Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552966. In one respect, 
the elimination of ex ante arbitration agreements involving consumers, employees, and other 
protected parties—which raise a whole host of unique issues—might very well make it much 
easier to address the inadequacy of the FAA, as related to commercial, business-to-business 
arbitration. It is often observed that one of the most significant challenges in amending the 
FAA is the fear of opening the proverbial “Pandora’s box” of special interests, particularly 
those involving consumer and employment arbitration. Park, The Specificity of International 
Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1295; see also Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 235. 
With these concerns removed, it may be easier to address more basic business concerns 
regarding the existing legal structure. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New 
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has also been subject to critiques and calls for amendment to correct a variety 
of other deficiencies.16 The problems presented by the FAA are perceived by 
many to be particularly acute in the context of international transactions, 
leading to calls for a variety of potential solutions, including amendment,17 a 
new “restatement” of existing common law,18 and even a completely new 
statute specifically governing international commercial arbitration.19 How-
ever, there have been very few, if any, thorough examinations of the potential 
value of a comprehensive new statute governing both domestic and 
international commercial arbitration.20 This Article attempts to fill that void. 
The objective of this Article is to explore more fully the idea of commercial, 
business-to-business arbitration,21 not simply as a contract subject to auto-
nomous ordering, limited by any appropriate mandatory legal rules, but as a 
sufficiently unique and important genus of contract to justify a specific, 
                                                                                                                         
Litigation, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1, 57 (2010) (explaining that an understanding of key 
contextual differences between business-to-business transactions, as compared to consumer 
and employee transactions, is essential to lawmakers); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in 
Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 417-18 (2009) 
(noting the “maul[ing]” of U.S. domestic arbitration by the “claws of politicalization”). 
However, depending on the final structure of any amendment addressing consumer or 
employment arbitration, important elements of business-to-business, commercial arbitration 
might be adversely affected. See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story 
of Anti-Arbitration Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233 (2007); 
Edna Sussman, The Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S. 
Business, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 455 (2007) (addressing similar legislation to the current 
legislation cited above). The comprehensive approach to new legislation ultimately 
suggested by this article would, however, avoid such unintended spillover from any efforts to 
amend the current statute. 
16
 See Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration 
System: Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASS-
ESSMENT 63-87 (2006). 
17
 See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1242-43. 
18
 George A. Bermann, et al., Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial 
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333 (2009) (outlining the purpose, scope, and drafting 
process of the Third Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration). 
19
 See Coe, supra note 14, at 2-4. 
20
 For two excellent examples of recent national legislation governing both domestic and 
international commercial arbitration, one might consider the United Kingdom’s Arbitration 
Act, 1996, c. 23 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 1996/23/contents 
(demonstrating a statute with a common law heritage), or Germany’s Arbitration Act, 
Schiedsverfahrensrecht [Arbitration Act], Jan. 1, 1998 (Ger.), available at http://www.dis-
arb.de/materialien (showing a statute with a civil law heritage). 
21
 This Article will address both domestic and international commercial arbitration, but 
will exclude arbitration of consumer and employment agreements, each of which present 
various issues that differ significantly from those faced in commercial, business-to-business 
arbitration. 
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comprehensive, and systematic legal regime, complete with a fully developed 
set of default legal provisions. 
This Article begins, in Part I, by examining the specific potential for 
incomplete commercial agreements to arbitrate disputes and the application 
of various theories of default rules to these incomplete agreements. Under the 
vast majority of legal regimes governing arbitration, including the FAA, a 
simple agreement to final and binding arbitration of commercial disputes is 
fully enforceable—even if the agreement says little, if anything, else about 
the process of dispute resolution.22 Thus, an agreement to arbitrate presents a 
number of classic issues in providing for default rules, as well as some par-
ticularized issues based on the nature of an arbitration agreement. These 
issues are further analyzed in terms of the theory of nominate contracts and 
analogized to the manner in which American law treats agreements for the 
sale of goods23 and partnership agreements24—albeit by reference to uniform 
state law rather than a federal statute.25 In considering these issues, the UNC-
ITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL 
Model Law)26 provides a useful point of comparative reference, as a 
comprehensive statutory scheme providing a broad array of default rules 
governing arbitration. 
Part II addresses potential sources of gap filling for incomplete contracts, 
beginning with an analysis of existing law under the FAA—a statute almost 
                                                 
22
 An arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity of the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
23
 See generally U.C.C. art. 2 (superseded 2003). 
24
 See generally UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997). 
25
 This distinction is more fully discussed infra, Part II. 
26
 Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, 
U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I, at 81-93 (June 21, 1985) 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. This model law has been adopted, in substance, by 
over fifty countries and six U.S. states. See Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law on Int’l 
Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL: U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http:// 
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/encitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last 
visited Mar.27, 2011) [hereinafter Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law]. For a discussion  
of the effect of U.S. state adoptions see infra Part II.C.3 on the law governing international 
commercial arbitration. At least one country, Germany, has also adopted the UNCITRAL 
Model Law to govern domestic arbitration as well. Dr. Stefan Kröll, Germany, in III 
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 1 (Albert Jan van den Berg 
ed., 2007). The UNCITRAL Model Law was amended in 2006 to modernize the writing 
requirement (art. 7) and add a far more comprehensive set of provisions governing interim 
measures. See Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l 
Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/61/17, annex I at 56-60 (as 
revised on July 7, 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 Amendment]. 
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entirely devoid of default legal rules regarding the conduct of arbitration 
proceedings.27 In evaluating the effectiveness of the FAA as a set of default 
legal rules, Part II.A also looks at a variety of challenges under the existing 
multi-part statutory structure, while Part II.B addresses the broader question 
of whether gaps in agreements to arbitrate are more effectively filled by 
courts under a common law approach or by the legislature under a comp-
rehensive statutory approach. 
Part II.C then examines the question of whether gaps—if statutorily 
filled—are best addressed by state or federal law. While most state laws 
historically provided little more than the FAA in the way of default rules, the 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA)28 expressly attempts to fill 
this void with respect to domestic arbitration.29 However, it is debatable 
whether RUAA goes far enough in providing a comprehensive statute, and its 
effectiveness is significantly limited by the potentially broad and, to some 
degree, uncertain pre-emptive effect of the FAA on various matters addressed 
by RUAA.30 A number of United States states have attempted to fill the void 
left by the FAA with respect to international commercial arbitration by 
adopting at least substantial portions of the UNCITRAL Model Law.31 
However, these adoptions have not been particularly uniform,32 and 
significant unresolved issues of preemption call into question the 
effectiveness of such adoptions.33 
Part II.D addresses the availability of various institutional and ad hoc 
arbitration rules and the potential that such rules might obviate the need for 
any default legal rules. In comparing the relative value and effectiveness of 
default legal rules versus the parties’ own agreement, including privately 
chosen rules, Part II.D addresses the specific challenges of the unique 
contractual version of competence-competence (the jurisdiction of an arbitral 
tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction) developed by the United States 
Supreme Court in its interpretation of the FAA. 
In conclusion, this Article calls for a new and comprehensive federal 
statutory scheme governing domestic and international commercial arb-
itration—and fully replacing the existing Federal Arbitration Act. Such a 
                                                 
27
 Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 15, at 
236, 238. 
28
 UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) [hereinafter RUAA]. 
29
 Id. at Prefatory Note.    
30
 See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 420 tbl.1. 
31
 See Jack J. Coe Jr., The Serviceable Texts of International Commercial Arbitration: An 
Embarrassment of Riches, 10 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 143, 148 (2002). 
32
 Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL’s Work Towards a Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration, 4 PACE L. REV. 537, 538 (1984). 
33
 See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 407-25.  
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scheme could eliminate the need for state law or any “restatement” of the 
existing common law governing arbitration in this country and would fully 
complement the use of private rules of arbitration, to the extent the latter 
might be incorporated by the parties into their arbitration agreement. 
 
I. INCOMPLETE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE: THE NEED 
FOR DEFAULT RULES 
 
Parties may conclude a binding agreement to arbitrate their disputes by 
simply saying so in writing.34 They need not say anything more about the 
specific nature of their intent. As long as they agree to final and binding 
arbitration of a defined range of disputes and the dispute in question falls 
within the scope of this range, each of the parties is fully bound to comply.35 
In agreeing to arbitration, the parties will have effectively displaced a 
detailed and fully developed set of procedures for adjudication of their 
dispute by a court. In the case of a simple, bare-bones agreement to arbitrate, 
however, the parties will have provided nothing to replace these court 
procedures. While a simplified dispute resolution procedure is admittedly one 
of the major reasons parties choose arbitration, few would likely say they 
chose arbitration for the lack of any procedure at all. Thus, we have a very 
real potential for binding arbitration agreements that lack a significant degree 
of completeness. 
 
A. Reasons for Incomplete Arbitration Agreements 
 
All contracts are, to at least some degree, incomplete.36 The reasons for 
this lack of completeness vary, but might generally be divided into two broad 
categories: (1) lack of ex ante awareness of all of the factual or legal issues 
                                                 
34
 In fact, an agreement need not even necessarily be in writing under the current version 
of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 Amendment, supra 
note 26, art. 7. See also Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing Requirement: Following Modern 
Trends Towards Liberalization or Are We Stuck in 1958?, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 36 (2009) 
(discussing the liberalization of form requirements for arbitration agreements). However, the 
extent to which national legislatures will follow this trend towards liberalizing form 
requirements governing arbitration agreements is yet to be determined. Id. at 39. 
35
 Of course, the parties can always mutually agree to modify or terminate their 
agreement, as in the case of any contract. However, an agreement on the resolution of 
disputes is often particularly difficult to modify at the time of its performance because parties 
in need of binding dispute resolution will often have a difficult time agreeing on anything. 
36
 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 
VA. L. REV. 821, 821 (1992). 
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that might ultimately arise between the parties; and (2) lack of willingness or 
ability to expend the time, energy, goodwill, or financial capital to resolve the 
issue at the time of contract formation.37 The reasons for the latter source of 
incompleteness are particularly acute in the context of arbitration agreements. 
In some circumstances, “the very act of negotiating for a specific contract 
term may signal negative information to the other party.”38 While the basic 
suggestion of resolving any disputes through arbitration might generally be 
viewed in a positive light,39 attempts to provide further details with respect to 
such arbitration might very well suggest that the party suggesting these 
details believes an arbitrated dispute to be a likely outcome of the parties’ 
relationship.40 Or, even worse, any detailed negotiation of an arbitration 
agreement might be seen as an attempt to gain a tactical advantage in the 
event of such an outcome.41 Thus, an arbitration agreement is even more 
likely to be incomplete as a result of the perceived costs of completing the 
agreement more fully. 
Many parties, as well as many of their transactional counsel, will also 
often lack a thorough understanding of the myriad of issues that may—and 
all too often do—arise during the process of resolving a dispute through 
arbitration.42 When considering the options for binding dispute resolution, the 
parties essentially have two choices: (1) litigation; or (2) arbitration. While 
there are a host of positive, well documented reasons why parties affirm-
                                                 
37
 Id. at 822; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (defining, more narrowly, 
the former category based on one party’s strategic behavior in consciously withholding 
information from its contracting partner). In the analysis that follows, this Article will treat 
this alternative source of incompleteness discussed by Ayres and Gertner as a subset of the 
broader category of cases in which the parties’ knowledge is incomplete, for whatever 
reason. 
38
 Stephen J. Choi, The Problem with Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 1233, 1236 (2003).  
39
 At a very basic level, a general suggestion at the time of contracting that the parties 
agree to stay out of court would often be seen as quite positive in terms of the future 
relationship. 
40
 Choi, supra note 38, at 1236. In addition, even sophisticated parties will often enter 
into a contractual relationship with an overly optimistic belief in their ability to avoid 
disputes, thereby reducing the potential value of “completing” the dispute resolution term. 
Id. 
41
 In fact, at least one author suggests negotiating arbitration agreements in hopes of 
achieving just such a tactical advantage. Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 388-89. However, 
this same author agrees that, as a practical matter, this is often quite difficult, because parties 
intent on making a deal are reluctant to dwell on the subject of possible conflict resolution. 
Id. at 390. 
42
 Id. at 389. 
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atively choose arbitration,43 many also choose it simply because of what it is 
not—in effect, choosing arbitration simply because it is not litigation.44 As a 
general alternative to litigation—albeit one that many parties do not fully 
understand—an agreement to arbitrate will often be incomplete based on the 
parties’ lack of knowledge regarding many of the nuanced details of 
arbitration. 
When we consider both the lack of knowledge with respect to many 
parties and their transactional counsel, as well as the significant potential 
costs of negotiating terms in specific contemplation of an eventual contract 
dispute, it is easy to see why many arbitration agreements are incomplete. 
This of course leads to the question of how, if at all, such agreements should 
be completed.  
 
B. Should the Law Fill Gaps in Any Manner When an Arbitration Agreement 
is Incomplete? 
 
The initial question is whether gaps in an incomplete arbitration agree-
ment should be filled at all. The act of filling gaps in the parties’ agreement is 
ultimately a double-edged sword. On one hand, completing those items the 
parties left out due to ignorance or the high cost of completion would 
seemingly serve the parties’ interests in giving full effect to their intentions.45 
On the other hand, completing the parties’ agreement also risks the 
                                                 
43
 See Christopher Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use) 
Arbitration Clauses? 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 435-37 (2010); Hon. Curtis E. von 
Kann, A Report Card on the Quality of Commercial Arbitration: Assessing and Improving 
Delivery of the Benefits Customers Seek, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 499, 500-01 (2009); 
see also Loukas Mistelis & Crina Baltag, Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
and Settlement in International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices, 18 AM. REV. 
INT’L ARB. 319, 320, 322 (2008) (explaining a 2008 survey of corporate attitudes towards 
international commercial arbitration, but also useful with respect to commercial arbitration, 
more generally). 
44
 Stephen L. Hayford, Building a More Perfect Beast: Rethinking the Commercial 
Arbitration Agreement, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 437, 439 (2009) (explaining parties’ 
very fundamental desire for “a clear alternative to traditional litigation”). 
45
 See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986) (suggesting 
that the law should supply the terms the parties would have adopted had they addressed the 
issue); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper 
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985) (providing the parties with the term they 
would have negotiated had they recognized the issue and had the time and money to address 
it). But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 90-91 (suggesting that the most efficient 
default terms will not always be those the parties would have wanted, but may sometimes be 
those that at least one party does not favor). 
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possibility of getting it wrong. In fact, the parties may perceive that their 
agreement is fully complete—notwithstanding apparent gaps. 
For example, the parties to an arbitration agreement may have simply 
provided for binding arbitration before a single arbitrator chosen by the 
parties. While one might suggest that this agreement leaves a rather large gap 
with respect to the arbitral procedure, it might also be that the parties simply 
intended to grant the arbitrator complete discretion with respect to pro-
cedure.46 If so, then perhaps the agreement does not really include any gaps 
at all. 
The FAA does not speak directly to this possibility.47 However, the 
UNCITRAL Model Law provides a potential indication of the parties’ likely 
normative views. Article 19(2) provides that an “arbitral tribunal may, 
subject to the provisions of [the UNCITRAL Model Law], conduct the 
arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.”48 One might 
reasonably infer that this represents a commercial norm suggesting that the 
parties often prefer broad grants of discretion to the arbitrators. However, this 
apparently broad grant of authority comes in the context of a very well 
developed set of default rules governing many of the most common 
procedures likely to arise in arbitral proceedings.49 Thus, it is much more 
difficult to draw any inference that parties would typically grant complete 
discretion to arbitrators in the absence of any default rules. Moreover, any 
exercise of arbitrator discretion presupposes the existence of an arbitrator to 
exercise that discretion and, without at least some sort of default rule 
regarding the appointment of an arbitrator, effectuation of the parties’ 
agreement to arbitrate is impossible.50 
Once an arbitrator has been chosen, the parties may grant that arbitrator 
broad authority to decide their dispute on equitable principles without 
                                                 
46
 See Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169, 180-
81 (2007) (suggesting “unfettered arbitral discretion and control” as the “universally 
accepted ‘meta gap-filler’”). 
47
 See id. Though, one might argue that the FAA speaks indirectly to the issue by largely 
omitting any gap fillers. Seemingly, this is Professor Rau’s view in suggesting the lack of 
need for specific FAA gap fillers. See id. 
48
 UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 Amendment, supra note 26, art. 19(2). 
49
 See, e.g., id. art. 17. 
50
 One of the very few default rules provided by the FAA is that, if the parties cannot 
agree, a court shall appoint an arbitrator. 9 U.S.C § 5 (2006). Court appointment is not, 
however, the only option. Many institutional rules provide for appointment by the institution. 
See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION 
PROCEDURES 8 r.11 (2010); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98, art. 6, U.N. 
GAOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976) (providing for designation of any 
appointing authority by the Permanent Court of arbitration). 
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reference to any particular substantive law.51 This sort of arbitrator authority 
might also suggest a broad discretionary norm. However, arbitral rules 
addressing the issue require the parties’ express consent to grant the arbitrator 
such broad discretionary power over the substance of their dispute.52 In the 
same vein, the parties are unlikely to have intended a grant of virtually 
unlimited procedural discretion in the absence of a clear indication of that 
intent. Thus, the parties’ intentions are most likely served by default terms 
reflecting those they would have likely agreed upon in the event they had 
addressed the issues in question. 
 
C. What Sort of Default Rules Might Be Appropriate for Filling Gaps in 
Incomplete Arbitration Agreements? 
 
The classic “majoritarian” approach to default rules is to seek to 
determine the rule that most similarly situated parties would have wanted had 
they actually considered and negotiated the issue at the time of contracting.53 
In contrast, one of the most commonly discussed alternatives is the “penalty” 
default approach.54 The basic idea of a penalty default is that the default rule 
should be designed to be a rule disfavored by a party likely to possess 
information useful to its contracting partner.55 The party with the relevant 
information is, therefore, faced with the option of either accepting a rule it 
does not like or disclosing the information.56 In the case of arbitration 
agreements, a “majoritarian” approach is likely to be the most appropriate. 
Penalty defaults are most appropriate when the ex ante cost of contracting 
is relatively cheap.57 However, the cost of contracting for specific details of 
                                                 
51
 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N & INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INT’L 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 13 art.28(1) (2009). 
52
 Id. at art.28(3). 
53
 Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1441-42 (2009); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 93. 
54
 Fairfield, supra note 53; see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 97. One of the classic 
examples of a penalty default is the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, which provides that 
consequential damages are limited by foreseeability. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150 (1854). The 
party contracting for carriage is faced with either accepting a limit on liability for late 
delivery or disclosing to its contracting partner information as to the potentially large losses 
it might suffer with respect to late delivery. Id. With such information in hand, the carrier can 
negotiate over whether it is willing to accept such risks and at what price. Id. 
55
 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 97. 
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. at 93. 
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an arbitration agreement is likely to be particularly high.58 Moreover, it 
seems unlikely that, at the time of contracting, either party would be 
strategically withholding information regarding a potential arbitration process 
that the other might value in negotiating a more detailed arbitration agree-
ment.59 A majoritarian approach also seems particularly appropriate when 
one looks at commercial arbitration from a normative perspective. 
To a large degree, most business parties to a commercial arbitration 
agreement share the same general expectations. In choosing arbitration of a 
dispute arising out of a commercial, business-to-business transaction, the 
parties are typically interested in the following characteristics: 
 
• Arbitration is generally perceived as faster than litigation and, 
at least to the extent it is faster, cheaper than litigation;60 
• Arbitration is generally perceived as more flexible and less 
adversarial than litigation; 
• The parties may choose their decision-maker for his or her 
expertise, thereby leading to more accurate outcomes; 
• Arbitration is private and largely confidential;61 and 
• The decision of the arbitrator is final, thus bringing closure to 
the dispute and allowing the parties to return to any remaining 
business relationship.62 
 
When the transaction crosses national borders, the parties to an inter-
national commercial arbitration agreement share the same expectations listed 
above, but also typically choose arbitration for two additional reasons: 
                                                 
58
 See supra Part I.A. 
59
 At the time of contract conclusion, it seems unlikely that either party would be 
sufficiently prescient to know what information it might strategically withhold from the other 
or, in contrast, disclose in attempting to negotiate around a disfavored default rule.  
60
 The cost of the arbitrator makes this aspect of arbitration more expensive than 
litigation. However, the speed and efficiency of arbitration are generally thought to more 
than compensate for this cost, thus reducing the overall cost of the process. But see JACKSON 
WILLIAMS, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 61-67 (Frank Clemente et al. eds., 
2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF11 0A.PDF. 
61
 The parties may agree upon a confidentiality requirement within the arbitration 
proceedings themselves. See, e.g., JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES AND 
PROCEDURES 27 r.26(a) (2009). They may also agree upon a requirement that the parties, the 
arbitrators, and any institution maintain such confidentiality outside of the proceedings. See, 
e.g., LCIA, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 30.1 (1998). However, any such agreement is subject 
to required disclosures pursuant to judicial proceedings. JAMS, supra; LCIA, supra. Thus, 
the benefit of confidentiality is often lost when parties end up in court over issues arising out 
of the arbitration agreement. 
62
 See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 43, at 451-52; Kann, supra note 43, at 500-01. 
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• Arbitration provides a neutral forum, as compared to national 
courts; and 
• Arbitration awards are generally easier to enforce in a national 
jurisdiction other than that in which they are issued.63 
 
These latter two attributes related to international transactions in no way 
conflict with the former list of more general characteristics. Thus, there is no 
apparent reason why a set of default rules for domestic commercial 
arbitration would necessarily need to be any different from those suitable for 
international commercial arbitration. 
We can also find significant agreement on those attributes of arbitration 
agreements that parties find least attractive, most of which relate to the 
increased costs and delay associated with two things: (1) the increasing 
tendency of lawyers—especially American lawyers—to turn arbitration into 
something that looks very much like litigation;64 and (2) court proceedings in 
connection with an arbitration agreement.65 Each of these concerns can, to 
some degree, be minimized with an appropriate set of default rules.66 
A regime of default rules for arbitration based on a majoritarian approach 
would, therefore, likely include rules providing for a relatively expeditious, 
inexpensive, cooperative and flexible means of dispute resolution before a 
neutral expert decision maker; conducted in a private and confidential setting; 
and culminating in a final, and fully enforceable award, deciding the merits 
of the parties’ dispute, all with as little court intervention as possible. 
Admittedly, there are several important variations on this general theme, and 
frequent variations are found in institutional arbitration rules. However, these 
variations in rules are in no way inconsistent with the premise that a 
                                                 
63
 See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 43, at 452; MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 
8, at 312-15. 
64
 See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses Its Grip: Are U.S. 
Lawyers to Blame? 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (2010); see also Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39 
(pointing out the stark difference between clients’ interest in efficient and cost effective 
dispute resolution and the lawyer’s interest in fighting to win every possible battle 
irrespective of the costs or effectiveness of doing so). 
65
 See, e.g., Lou Whiteman, Arbitration’s Fall from Grace, CORPORATE COUNSEL (July 
13, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1152695125655. 
66
 The third concern about arbitration is that of the inability to join other parties to the 
dispute who are not parties to the arbitration agreement. While some national laws and 
institutional rules have begun to address this issue in a limited manner, arbitral jurisdiction is 
ultimately based on consent, and, without consent, joinder is likely to remain a challenge. As 
such, this issue is not addressed in the context of this default rules analysis. 
2011]             ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT          241   
       
 
substantial majority of parties to an arbitration agreement are looking for the 
same general characteristics in resolving their dispute. For example, one 
might analogize a set of arbitration rules to the rules of carriage found in 
standard shipping terms, such as “Ex Works,” “Free on Board,” or “Cost, 
Insurance, and Freight.”67 However, the fact that parties may choose terms of 
carriage that differ on important issues in no way undermines the value of the 
default rules found in uniform sales law, such as Uniform Commercial Code 
(U.C.C.) Article 2 or the United Nations Convention on the International Sale 
of Goods.68 In a similar fashion, a set of default rules governing commercial 
arbitration would provide a valuable baseline in filling gaps in the parties’ 
agreement in the absence of any express choice—either directly or by incorp-
oration. 
It is often said that arbitration is based entirely on consent.69 When 
business parties fail to contract around a set of established default legal rules, 
the parties might reasonably be said to have tacitly consented to these rules 
by their silence.70 However, such an inference is only reasonable if (1) the 
parties had reason to know of the default rule and (2) the cost of contracting 
around the rule is not prohibitive.71 The latter issue, in particular, presents a 
problem in the context of an arbitration agreement because, as discussed 
earlier, the costs of negotiating an arbitration agreement may often be 
unusually high.72 Whether such costs are sufficiently high to preclude an 
inference of tacit consent, the issue is at least a problematic one in terms of 
inferring consent from silence. However, even where parties cannot be said 
to have tacitly consented via silence, the imposition of default legal rules 
“may still be justified on the grounds of consent when default rules are 
chosen to reflect the common sense or conventional understanding of most 
parties.”73 
In contracting for arbitration, “the parties’ subjective intent is most likely 
to be satisfied by a default rule that interprets manifested consent to reflect 
the commonsense or conventional expectations that are likely part of the tacit 
                                                 
67International Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms 2010, http://www.iccwbo.org/ 
incoterms/id3040/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Incoterms 2010].  
68
 See infra Part II.D for a more developed comparison of default contract terms, adopted 
by way of incorporation, with default legal rules, adopted by choosing a particular seat for 
the arbitration. 
69
 CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (2003).  
70
 Barnett, supra note 36, at 826. 
71
 Id. at 866. 
72
 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
73
 Barnett, supra note 36, at 827. 
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assumptions of particular parties.”74 Such commonsense expectations are 
those normative expectations shared by most people choosing arbitration for 
dispute resolution. Thus, where default rules are based on a strong, 
majoritarian set of commercial norms, they may be said to reflect the 
commonly held consent of the commercial arbitration community. To some 
degree, this argument might be made in support of any set of normative 
default rules, such as U.C.C. Article 2.75 However, the normative force of 
expectations within the arbitration community is arguably even greater than 
in most such identifiable transactional communities, as those common sense 
expectations tend to be particularly pervasive within that community. Thus, 
majoritarian default rules governing arbitration agreements may be reason-
ably characterized as reflecting the general consent of those businesses 
choosing to resolve their disputes through arbitration. 
The final issue regarding the nature of default rules is the extent to which 
such rules might be tailored to the particular circumstances of specific 
parties.76 Perhaps one of the most significant choices in dispute resolution 
generally and arbitration in particular is the choice between speed and cost on 
the one hand and reaching the “correct” decision on the other. This apparent 
tension need not necessarily present any conflict at all, as many disputes can 
be arbitrated quickly, inexpensively, and accurately—without sacrificing any 
of these virtues. However, to the extent these concerns may sometimes 
conflict, the parties’ expectations at the time of contracting may differ 
depending on the nature of the transaction subject to resolution of disputes 
through arbitration. If so, it may be worth considering whether default rules 
can be tailored to address this particular potential difference in expectations. 
The most significant critique of arbitration today comes from the cost and 
delay associated with long, protracted proceedings,77 and the business comm-
unity is increasingly calling for a more expeditious, cost effective process.78 
However, in at least some instances, business parties may value getting the 
                                                 
74
 Id. at 880. 
75
 Such “common sense” rules might be contrasted with those that would not be part of 
the commonsense expectations of most commercial parties. For example, the default rules 
regarding the division of partnership profits seem quite contrary to common sense in many 
circumstances. Id. at 884. 
76
 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91-92 (noting the distinction between tailored and 
untailored defaults). 
77
 Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 51; see also Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39 (noting 
business decision makers concerns with delay and opportunity costs). 
78
 See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39; Peter Morton, Can a World Exist Where 
Expedited Arbitration Becomes the Default Procedure? 26 ARB. INT’L 103, 104 (2010). 
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“correct” result over efficiency. Thus, a set of default legal rules governing 
arbitration might distinguish between default rules applicable in expedited 
arbitration and those applicable in non-expedited arbitration.79 One option 
would be to leave this distinction to the arbitrators to make a determination 
on a case-by-case basis, depending on what is “reasonable in the 
circumstances.”80 While it is difficult to identify any singular method for 
distinguishing between the parties’ expectations in all circumstances, the size 
of the transaction will often provide a strong indication.81 
In any event, this potential conflict between efficiency and accuracy is 
one of the differences between party expectations most likely to lead to a 
need for tailored defaults,82 and any set of default legal rules governing 
arbitration should consider and address this and any other such issues. 
However, the need for a few select, tailored default rules in no way precludes 
a largely majoritarian approach to the provision of default legal rules 
governing incomplete agreements to arbitrate. 
In thinking about a set of default legal rules governing arbitration, it is 
also worth considering the broader structural framework for such rules. For 
this purpose, Article 2 of the U.C.C.,83 as well as the Uniform Partnership 
Act (both original and revised),84 provide useful analogies. 
 
                                                 
79
 For example—and only by way of example—the former might provide default rules 
requiring only a single arbitrator, minimal discovery, and short time frames for submission 
of pleadings, while the latter might provide for three arbitrators and greater opportunity for 
discovery. One might also suggest, in the latter case, an opportunity for some sort of 
substantive appellate review—an option arguably foreclosed under the FAA. See Hall St. 
Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that the provisions for review of  
an arbitrator’s decision under sections 10 and 11 are exclusive). 
80
 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91-92. This approach is used in a variety of 
provisions within U.C.C. Article 2. See, e.g., U.C.C § 2-206 (2005) (contract offer “inviting 
acceptance” when in manner “reasonable in the circumstances”). 
81
 See, e.g., THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY OF BASEL, BERN, GENEVA, 
NEUCHÂTEL, TICINO, VAUD AND ZURICH, SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 21 
art.42 (2006) (providing a default rule for expedited arbitration of disputes of less than one 
million Swiss Francs). 
82
 The Swiss Rules actually contemplate both a discretionary tailored rule based on the 
“complexity of the subject matter and/or the amount in dispute.” Id. at 9 art.6(2) (providing 
for discretion as to the number of arbitrators), as well as a “bright line” tailored rule. Id. at 21 
art.42(2) (providing for expedited procedures below a certain amount in dispute).    
83
 U.C.C. §§ 2-305, -308, -309 (providing default terms for incomplete contracts). 
84
 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 
1 (1997) (stating in the Prefatory Note that the Act is “largely a series of default rules that 
govern the relations among partners in situations they have not addressed in a partnership 
agreement”), available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/Home_desktop default.aspx (follow 
“Final Acts & Legislation” link; then find the act in “Select an Act Title” box).  
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D. Arbitration Agreements as Nominate Contracts? 
 
The treatment of sales and partnership as unique and specific forms of 
contract goes back to Roman law, where each was treated as a form of 
nominate contract, complete with its own set of default provisions.85 The 
French Civil Code also treated arbitration as a nominate contract—a 
distinction still maintained today in the civil codes of Louisiana and 
Quebec.86 In the case of such nominate contracts, a code will necessarily 
provide for a default set of rights and obligations, which will govern the 
parties’ agreement in the absence of any contrary intent. While the theoretical 
underpinnings of traditional civilian nominate contracts and common law 
default rules are admittedly distinct, the basic ideas are sufficiently similar to 
be worthy of our consideration in drawing possible analogies. This civil law 
approach to codification of traditional nominate contracts is, to some degree, 
reflected in the U.S. approach to codification of the law governing the sale of 
goods and partnerships—two of the oldest forms of nominate contracts.87 As 
another traditional form of nominate contract, arbitration arguably deserves a 
comparable comprehensive and systematic approach to codification. 
In his campaign for enactment of a uniform commercial code governing, 
inter alia, sales of goods, Professor Karl Llewellyn often pointed to the cost 
of uncertainty in commercial transactions governed by common law as being 
a result of the uncertainty linked with the outcome being determintated by the 
highest court of the relevant jurisdiction.88 Llewellyn sought to avoid that 
uncertainty by providing a highly structured set of default legal rules gov-
erning the parties’ transactions in the absence of any contrary intent.89 He 
employed a normative approach to drafting these rules and weaved the 
individual provisions together in a comprehensive and systematic mosaic 
within which its own fabric often provides the basis for filling any remaining 
gaps.90 While perhaps not as storied as Llewellyn’s drafting of the U.C.C., 
the uniform laws governing partnership agreements in this country provide 
additional examples of comprehensive and systemic codifications of a 
                                                 
85
 BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 46 (1982). 
86
 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-:4217 (2010); Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 2005, 
c. 18 (Can.). 
87
 See supra notes 83-84. 
88
 Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 407, 428-29 (1996). 
89
 Id. at 429-31. 
90
 Id. at 428-29. 
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specific form of contract that could otherwise be governed by the common 
law of contracts.91 
As explained more fully below, the same sort of uncertainty Llewellyn 
spoke of, over fifty years ago, exists today with arbitration agreements 
governed by the FAA—a bare bones statute largely displaced by federal 
“common law.”92 Instead of providing a comprehensive and systematic 
approach to the law governing arbitration, the FAA relies almost entirely on 
the common law of contracts, along with the developing federal common law 
governing those unanswered common law of contracts questions.93 There is 
no good reason why arbitration contracts do not deserve the same thoughtful 
statutory treatment the law provides to other unique contracts, such as those 
for the sale of goods or partnership.94 
The vast majority of other modern legal systems have done much more 
than the United States to develop default legal rules governing arbitration.95 
The UNCITRAL Model Law (adopted, at least in part, by over fifty countries 
and seven U.S. states)96 contains a well-developed and reasonably comp-
rehensive set of default provisions systematically addressing many of the 
issues that might arise under an arbitration agreement that does not 
incorporate a complete set of private institutional or ad hoc rules.97 A number 
of other countries, including France and England, have their own unique 
default legal regimes governing arbitration—somewhat different from the 
Model Law, but each far more comprehensive than the FAA.98  
Admittedly, not every incomplete contract should be completed by 
reference to default rules and not every type of contract requires a uniquely 
tailored statutory scheme.99 However, the unique and specialized nature of an 
                                                 
91
 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
92
 Margaret Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a 
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 99-100 
(2006). 
93
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (stating that an arbitration agreement is valid “save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). 
94
 One might ask at this stage if arbitration ought to be governed by uniform state law 
instead of federal law. In fact, a number of states have adopted either the original Uniform 
Arbitration Act or the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. See infra notes 248 & 257 and 
accompanying text. However, as more fully explained in Part II.C infra, the use of state law 
to cure the current ills of the FAA is fraught with its own set of perils. 
95
 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26; NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE 
CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1442-1507 (Fr.) [hereinafter Arbitration Rules of France]; Arbitration 
Act 1996, c. 23 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Arbitration Act].  
96
 Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26. 
97
 See generally id. 
98
 See Arbitration Rules of France, supra note 95; English Arbitration Act, supra note 95. 
99
 See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
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arbitration agreement,100 coupled with a significant body of strong and well-
established commercial norms surrounding such an agreement,101 would 
seem to demand a unique and comprehensive statute governing domestic and 
international commercial arbitration in this country.102 
 
II. FILLING THE GAPS: POTENTIAL SOURCES OF DEFAULT RULES 
 
The FAA governs both domestic and international arbitration.103 
Domestic arbitration is governed by Chapter 1,104 while international 
arbitration is governed by Chapters 2105 and 3.106 The original FAA (Chapter 
1) provides for enforcement of domestic agreements to arbitrate and grants 
the parties broad autonomy in structuring such arbitration,107 while providing 
very few default rules to guide the parties who fail to exercise that auto-
nomy.108 Therefore, when one is faced with a “gap” in the details of the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the FAA provides little guidance in filling that 
gap.109  
Chapter 2 of the FAA addresses foreign and other “non-domestic” agree-
ments to arbitrate110 and provides for the application of the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the New York 
Convention) to such arbitration agreements and any resulting awards.111 
Chapter 3 of the FAA also addresses foreign and other “non-domestic” 
agreements to arbitrate,112 but provides for the application of the Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (the Panama 
                                                                                                                         
L.J. 59, 67 (1993). 
100
 See Imre S. Szalai, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal 
Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 319, 321 (2007). 
101
 See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOVICH, FEDERAL 
ARBITRATION LAW § 7.1.2.1 (1999). 
102
 This idea is more fully discussed infra, Parts II.B-D. 
103
 See Szalai, supra note 100, at 325. 
104
 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).  
105
 Id. §§ 201-208. 
106
 Id. §§ 301-307. 
107
 Id. §§ 1-16. While a few new sections have been added to the FAA, such as those on 
appeal, 9 U.S.C. § 16, and the legal effect of the statute has arguably changed significantly 
through the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See generally Moses, supra note 
92. The text of the original 1925 statute remains largely unchanged today. 
108
 See Moses, supra note 92, at 111-112. 
109
 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307. 
110
 Id. §§ 201-208. 
111
 Id. § 201; New York Convention, supra note 6, § 201. 
112
 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307. 
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Convention)113 to arbitration agreements in which the majority of the parties 
are citizens of signatory states to the Panama Convention.114 While Chapters 
2 and 3 serve their intended purposes of giving effect to these respective 
Conventions, their interaction with FAA Chapter 1 also raises some issues of 
uncertainty in their application.115 In addition the Panama Convention raises 
a unique issue because of its adoption of a complete set of default rules of the 
Inter-American Arbitration Commission.116 
As more fully explained below, this broad, vague attempt at “statutory 
dépeçage”117 fails for at least two reasons. First, the overall statute is 
insufficiently detailed in providing default provisions.118 Second, many of the 
details it does provide in international transactions do not mesh well with the 
law governing domestic transactions, and the overall structure of the statute 
arguably creates as many questions as it resolves.119 
 
A. The Current State of American Federal Law Governing Commercial 
Arbitration 
 
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925120 for the specific purpose of 
overcoming “centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements121” and 
enforcing contracts on an equal basis with other common law contracts.122 
Since that time, the United States Supreme Court has given broad effect to 
this purpose in both federal and state courts123 and has consistently resisted 
                                                 
113
 Id. at § 301. See generally Panama Convention, supra note 7. 
114
 9 U.S.C. § 305(1) (2006). 
115
 See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1248. 
116
 See 9 U.S.C. § 306(a) (2006); Panama Convention, supra note 7, 1 art.3. See generally 
SICE, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Arbitration Commission , COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS (July 1, 1988) 
[hereinafter IACAC Rules], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/comarb 
/iacac/rop_e.asp. This incorporation of a complete set of default rules is unique in American 
arbitration law. 
117
 “Dépeçage” is the process whereby a single legal relationship may be governed by 
different laws. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469-470 (8th ed. 2004). The term seems 
appropriate here, where the FAA attempts to apply a collection of separate and independent 
legal instruments to govern a single contractual relationship—the agreement to arbitrate an 
international commercial dispute. 
118
 See Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 
15, at 236. 
119
 See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1248. 
120
 Szalai, supra note 100, at 325. 
121
 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974). 
122
 Id. at 510-11. 
123
 See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding the FAA 
applies in state courts, as well as federal courts). This was arguably the single most important 
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state efforts to limit the enforcement of arbitration agreements on any 
grounds other than those applying broadly to any and all contracts.124 For 
those favoring arbitration generally as a means of binding dispute resolution, 
the FAA would seem to be a resounding success in achieving its original 
goal.125 However, the parties to an arbitration agreement are likely seeking 
more than just enforceability of their agreement—they are also likely trying 
to stay out of court altogether.126 In this respect, the FAA, as interpreted by 
the Supreme Court, and as amended by Congress to accommodate inter-
national treaties, has arguably been far less successful.127 
 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Minimalist Approach to Domestic 
Arbitration Under Chapter 1 
 
The loadstar rule of FAA Chapter 1 is found in section 2,128 which 
provides that an agreement “to settle by arbitration a controversy … shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”129 An arbitration agreement is 
fully binding as long as: (1) the parties agree in writing to final and binding 
arbitration and (2) the dispute in question falls within the scope of the 
arbitration agreement.130 Of course, many arbitration agreements will provide 
                                                                                                                         
decision the Supreme Court has ever issued with respect to the FAA, because it preempted 
efforts by the states to regulate arbitration—at least to the extent such efforts were contrary 
to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of FAA article 2. Moreover, the preemption issues left 
open by Southland and subsequent Supreme Court cases are largely responsible for the 
uncertainty surrounding current state laws purporting to govern certain elements of 
arbitration. The original Southland decision drew a vigorous and well reasoned dissent. See 
id. at 21-36 (O’Connor, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). At least one justice is still 
fighting the battle lost in Southland. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 
546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting based on his view that the FAA does not 
apply in state court proceedings). 
124
 See, e.g., Doctor’s Assoc., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-88 (1996). 
125
 See Moses, supra note 92, at 99-100. 
126
 See John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins, 58 
DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 31 (2003). Even if court intervention is unnecessary to give effect to the 
parties’ arbitration agreement, a party may find it necessary to resort to courts regarding 
remedies such as specific relief, which are generally unavailable from the arbitral tribunal. 
127
 See, e.g., Moses, supra note 92, at 101. 
128
 David Horton, Essay, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 4 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/ 
2010/04/02/horton.pdf. 
129
 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  
130
 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 101, at § 7.1.2.1. 
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substantially more detail, either within the arbitration agreement itself, or by 
way of incorporation of a specific set of arbitration rules.131 Freedom of 
contract lies at the heart of commercial arbitration, with the parties granted 
broad autonomy in designing their own mechanism for the resolution of 
disputes.132 Moreover, parties are encouraged to exercise this broad auto-
nomy by thoughtfully and carefully crafting an arbitration regime meeting 
their specific needs.133 However, the parties do not always exercise this 
autonomy in any great detail,134 and their agreement to arbitrate will be 
enforced whether or not they provide such detail.135 
For example, the parties to an agreement might provide that “[a]ny 
disputes arising out of this Agreement will be finally resolved by binding 
arbitration.”136 The parties would almost certainly be bound to resolve their 
relevant contract disputes by arbitration.137 However, with such a minimalist 
arbitration agreement, they would have to look outside the FAA to ascertain 
the details of such arbitration.138 In theory, the law governing the arbitration 
should supply the default provisions necessary to fill any gaps.139 Un-
fortunately for the arbitrating parties, the FAA provides very little guidance 
in this respect.140 
In comparison with most modern arbitration statutes, the FAA is a “bare-
bones statute directed primarily at insuring that courts give effect to arb-
itration clauses and awards, and prescribes no significant procedural 
                                                 
131
 Id.  
132
 See Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 405. 
133
 Id. at 403. 
134
 See id. at 405. 
135
 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
136
 Townsend, supra note 126, at 31. Townsend suggests that this clause represents an 
extreme example of poor drafting. Id. However, this author has seen many such clauses in 
actual contracts drafted by both lawyers and laypeople. 
137
 Id. 
138
 Id. Of course, the parties could agree, after the dispute had arisen, to conduct the 
arbitration in a particular manner or according to a particular set of rules. However, it is 
common knowledge that, once a dispute has arisen, it is often difficult to get parties in an 
adversarial posture to agree on anything. For purposes of the foregoing analysis, I will 
assume that the parties are unable to reach consensus on any of the pertinent issues. 
139
 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 101, at § 7.1.2.1; see also ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN 
HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 3-42 (Sweet 
& Maxwell Ltd. eds., 4th ed. 2004) (explaining that, in international commercial arbitration, 
gaps are filled by reference to the governing arbitration law—typically that of the place of 
arbitration); Carbonneau, supra note 15, at 418 (pointing out that many of the procedural 
details of arbitration—about which the parties may disagree—can be resolved by reference 
to the law governing the arbitration, to the extent not addressed by the parties’ agreement). 
140
 See Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note 
15, at 236. 
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standards.”141 The FAA simply fails to answer many of the questions 
essential to the conduct of arbitration proceedings.142 As such, if the parties 
fail to answer these questions in their original agreement and cannot do so 
after the dispute has arisen, the questions all too often end up in court, thus 
arguably defeating the parties’ original purpose in agreeing to arbitrate in the 
first place.143 
Whatever one may think of the FAA, it would seem, beyond any rational 
argument to the contrary, that Chapter 1 does not itself fulfill any significant 
role in filling “gaps” by way of default rules.144 Thus, our next question is 
whether such gaps may reasonably be filled by the courts,145 by state law,146 
or by arbitration rules.147 Each of these will be addressed in turn below. 
However, before leaving the FAA behind, a few final issues are worth noting. 
 
2. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Rest of Chapter 1 
 
While the primary focus of this Article is default legal rules, this Article 
will also address a few other key legal rules under FAA Chapter 1, some of 
which are mandatory.148 While this Article ultimately suggests that the FAA 
be fully replaced—not amended—certain of these additional provisions are 
important to understanding other attempts to “fill the gaps” in the parties’ 
agreement, as well as some of the other challenges presented by the existing 
legal structure. 
                                                 
141
 Id. (quoting Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in 
International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 90 n.3 (1995)). 
142
 See id. at 238. 
143
 One of the greatest criticisms of arbitration today is the fact that parties bargaining for 
arbitration end up in court attempting to enforce their agreement. See, e.g., Whiteman, supra 
note 65, at 1 (explaining that “[o]ur company ended up investing more than a year’s worth of 
time and substantial legal fees simply to enforce in court our right not to have to go to 
court”). It is worth considering at this juncture that a positive agreement to arbitrate is also, 
to a large degree, a negative agreement to stay out of court. As such, a need to resort to court 
in order to conduct the agreed upon arbitration proceedings would seem anathema to a basic 
agreement to arbitrate. This issue is explored more fully infra Part II.B. 
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 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006). 
145
 See infra Part II.B. 
146
 See infra Part II.C. 
147
 See infra Part II.D. 
148
 Most provisions of Chapter 1, including section 2, rely entirely on party consent and 
are, therefore, subject to the parties’ right to override them—provided, of course, that the 
parties can agree. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. 
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FAA sections 3 and 4 provide for motions in federal court to stay any 
pending court action or compel the parties to arbitrate a dispute subject to a 
valid arbitration agreement under section 2.149 One might reasonably read 
section 4 as providing a mandatory rule that the court must determine 
whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement and whether the 
dispute is within its scope.150 However, the Supreme Court has apparently 
held otherwise, ruling that this is merely a default rule, which the parties may 
displace if they would prefer to grant the arbitrators jurisdiction to make 
these threshold decisions as to their own jurisdiction over the merits of the 
dispute.151 This issue is more fully explored in Part II.E below.152 
Assuming that the parties’ agreement mandates arbitration of the dispute 
in question, the next potentially relevant provisions are those applicable to 
the proceedings themselves.153 Section 5 provides a default rule for app-
ointment of arbitrators where one of the parties refuses to cooperate in 
constituting the panel.154 The court is to make the appointment consistent 
with the parties’ agreement, or, in the absence of any agreement, choose a 
single arbitrator.155 The statute does not, however, provide any guidance as to 
how the court might go about exercising such a choice.156 
Section 7 provides for court assistance in enforcing a subpoena issued by 
an arbitration panel.157 However, Chapter 1 contains nothing more con-
cerning the actual conduct of the arbitration from the time the tribunal is 
constituted through its issuance of a final award,158 which brings us to the last 
set of issues—those arising after an award has been issued. 
Section 9 provides for confirmation of an award: the process by which a 
private award is transformed into an enforceable public judgment.159 This 
section provides a time limit for confirmations, a notice requirement, and 
jurisdiction, but otherwise mandates that an award shall be confirmed absent 
                                                 
149
 Id. §§ 3-4. 
150
 See generally Horton, supra note 128 (claiming that section 4 is mandatory).  
151
 See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (explaining in 
dicta that “the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon what 
the parties agreed about that matter” (emphasis in original)); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. 
Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, n.1 (2010) (applying the First Options dicta to a “clear and 
unmistakable” delegation of this decisional power to the arbitrator). 
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 See infra Part II.E. 
153
 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 5-16. 
154
 Id. § 5. 
155
 Id.  
156
 Id.  
157
 Id. § 7. 
158
 See generally id. §§ 1-16. 
159
 Id. § 9. A motion for confirmation must be made within one year. 
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grounds for vacation under section 10, or modification or correction under 
section 11.160 Section 10 provides a narrow set of grounds for vacation, 
which might reasonably be summarized as mandating an arbitration process 
that comports with due process; is untainted by fraud, corruption, or bias; and 
is ultimately derived from the consent of the parties,161 while section 11 
provides for modification or correction of certain clerical mistakes or issues 
in which the arbitrators went beyond the consent of the parties.162 Lastly, 
appeals of lower court decisions at any stage of the process are addressed by 
section 16, which generally makes decisions contrary to arbitration subject to 
immediate appeal,163 while decisions favorable to arbitration may not be 
appealed until the process is complete through confirmation or vacation.164 
Thus, we might reasonably summarize the key elements of FAA Chapter 
1 by breaking down the governing law into three parts: (1) “front end” issues 
as to whether the dispute is subject to arbitration; (2) “arbitration procedure” 
issues involving actual arbitral process, from the constitution of the tribunal 
through the issuance of a final award; and (3) “back end” issues involving 
modification, confirmation, vacation, and/or enforcement of the award.165 
Along with the basic enforceability provisions found in section 2,166 the only 
significant additional front end rule is the default rule reflected in sections 3 
and 4 that courts determine whether the arbitrators have jurisdiction to hear 
the basic dispute.167 FAA Chapter 1 has only two significant default rules on 
arbitration procedure—one regarding the appointment of an arbitrator and 
one providing arbitrators with the power to subpoena witnesses.168  
 Most of the back end issues involve mandatory rules, and FAA Chapter 1 
provides an appropriately limited set of bases for vacation, modification, or 
correction.169 These bases for vacation in section 10 present other challenges, 
which will be addressed later in this part, as well as Part II.E infra.170 
                                                 
160
 Id.  
161
 Id. § 10. 
162
 Id. § 11. 
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 Id. § 16(a). 
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 Id. § 16(b). 
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 While one might reasonably break arbitration law down in a variety of ways, this 
Article will take what is, essentially, the same approach as the drafters of the Revised 
Uniform Arbitration Act. See RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note pp. 2-3, 5 (alluding to 
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process”).  
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 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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 See Szalai, supra note 100, at 326. 
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 See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16. 
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 Id. §§ 10-11. For purposes of this Article, I will omit further reference to section 16 on 
2011]             ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT          253   
       
 
Notably, each of the above default rules involves direct resort to the 
courts, and the rule regarding appointment of arbitrators provides no 
guidance for a court in fulfilling its duties. Instead of providing default 
provisions defining the rights and obligations of the parties and thereby 
filling any gaps in their agreement, FAA Chapter 1 simply sends the parties 
to the courts to resolve the issue—assuming it addresses the issue at all.171 
This approach is seemingly at odds with the most basic idea of arbitration—
the resolution of the parties’ dispute without resort to the courts. 
The default rule that courts determine whether the parties have agreed to 
arbitration says nothing about which of these threshold jurisdictional issues 
should be determined by a court and which should be determined by the 
arbitrators.172 As a result, this has been an often litigated issue, in some cases 
reaching the Supreme Court.173 Again, this issue is explored more fully in 
Part II.E below.174 
The FAA also says nothing about its application in state courts. While the 
Supreme Court has, since 1984, unequivocally stated that section 2 applies in 
state courts,175 the preemptive effects of the remainder of Chapter 1 are far 
less certain. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 2, coupled with 
the express language of sections 3 and 4, would seem to produce the odd 
result that the FAA governs actions in state court, but such actions cannot be 
removed to federal court absent diversity jurisdiction.176 The open issues 
involving preemption beyond section 2 call into serious question the rele-
vance of state arbitration statutes that purport to govern many of the same 
issues addressed by the FAA, as well as many issues to which the FAA does 
not speak. This convoluted example of federalism gone haywire is explored 
further in Part II.C below. At this point, it is sufficient to say that FAA 
                                                                                                                         
appeals, inasmuch as I do not believe its content is necessarily affected by the issues raised 
below. 
170
 Id. § 10. 
171
 Id. §§ 10-11. 
172
 Id. §§ 3-4. This is not a single, unitary decision. By way of example, here are just a 
few of the questions that might arise: Did the parties agree to arbitrate anything? Is the 
instant dispute within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate? Is the contract 
containing the arbitration clause itself voidable or void (the separability issue)? Is the dispute 
subject to arbitration at all, or is it one that must be heard by courts based on public policy? 
Have the parties complied with any preconditions to arbitration, such as a mediation process 
that might be contractually required beforehand? Are each of the putative parties to the 
arbitration actually parties to the agreement to arbitrate? 
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 See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002). 
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 Infra Part II.E.. 
175
 Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
176
 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. These statutes, by their express language apply only in federal 
court, and FAA Chapter 1 does not provide for federal question jurisdiction. 
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Chapter 1 leaves some “front end” issues in a state that is unnecessarily 
complicated and, in some cases, unresolved. 
There is little case law on FAA “arbitration procedure,” which is hardly 
surprising in view of the lack of FAA content addressing such issues. An 
exemplary case in this area involved the potential applicability of California 
state arbitration law, which provided for a stay of arbitration under certain 
circumstances, pending the outcome of related court proceedings.177 The 
outcome of this case presented anything but a clear picture with respect to the 
applicability of state law in any but the most clear-cut of circumstances.178 
While the FAA itself appears reasonably clear with respect to “back end” 
issues, the courts have, nonetheless, fashioned their own additional non-
statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards—the most notorious being 
“manifest disregard of the law.”179 Again, the extent of FAA preemption is 
uncertain and inconsistently applied by the courts. 
At bottom, FAA Chapter 1 does a very effective job of making arbitration 
agreements enforceable; however, what it gives with one hand, it takes away 
with the other. While arbitration agreements are generally enforced, the 
process of enforcing and executing those agreements all too often leads the 
parties right back to court to fight about issues that have nothing to do with 
their original contract dispute.180 It is no wonder that businesses are increas-
ingly becoming frustrated with arbitration, as they end up “in a costly, 
protracted court battle over an issue that, by contract, never should have 
ended up in court at all.”181 
 
3. The Federal Arbitration Act, Chapters 2 and 3: A Schizophrenic 
Approach to Default Rules in International Arbitration? 
 
The plot thickens as we move from domestic arbitration under FAA 
Chapter 1 to international arbitration under Chapters 2 and 3. In theory, 
Chapters 2 and 3182 were simply intended to implement the New York 
Convention183 and the Panama Convention184 in the context of foreign 
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 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989). 
178
 See infra note 280. 
179
 See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1249-51. But 
see Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008) (arguably eliminating the 
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 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
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182
 9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301 (2006). 
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 See generally New York Convention, supra note 6. 
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arbitration agreements and awards under the FAA.185 FAA Chapter 1 would 
still, however, apply to arbitration within the scope of either convention, 
unless in conflict with Chapter 2 or 3, or the relevant convention.185 
Inasmuch as both the New York and Panama Conventions deal primarily 
with enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements and awards, one might 
reasonably expect Chapters 2 and 3 to have little effect on arbitration 
conducted in the United States. We will see, however, that the provisions of 
these chapters have additional effects as well—at least some of which were 
not likely intended by the drafters. 
 
a. Arbitration Under the New York Convention 
 
Chapter 2 applies to arbitration agreements falling under the New York 
Convention—a convention that has been ratified by 145 countries.186 The 
application of the New York Convention is not, however, limited to awards 
made in foreign states. It also applies to awards that are not considered as 
domestic awards in the state where their recognition and enforcement are 
sought.187 FAA section 202 makes clear that any award that involves a 
foreign party or foreign property, or envisages foreign performance or 
enforcement is non-domestic—even if the arbitration takes place in the 
United States and is governed by United States law.188 Thus, Chapter 2 would 
apply, for example, to a transaction between United States parties that simply 
envisaged some foreign performance or potential enforcement against foreign 
assets. This broad definition of non-domestic awards solves one problem, but 
creates another. 
Section 203 provides federal question jurisdiction for all actions falling 
under the New York Convention, including all non-domestic awards, as 
defined in Section 202.189 As a result, the problem with the lack of federal 
                                                                                                                         
184
 See generally Panama Convention, supra note 7. 
185
 FAA sections 201 and 301 are central to their respective chapters, inasmuch as they 
each provide for enforcement of the respective conventions. See MACNEIL ET AL., supra 101, 
at § 44.8.3.1 (1999). 
185
 Id. 
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 Status: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, UNCITRAL: U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [hereinafter Status: 1958 
Convention] 
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visited Feb. 22, 2011). 
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 New York Convention, supra note 6, at art. I(1). 
188
 9 U.S.C. § 202 (2006). 
189
 Id. § 203. 
256 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW     [Vol. 2:225 
question jurisdiction under Chapter 1190 disappears under Chapter 2. To the 
extent that either party wishes to avail itself of the federal courts in enforcing 
the provisions of Chapter 2, removal is available191—irrespective of div-
ersity. Thus, the federal jurisdictional complexities associated with Chapter 1 
are avoided. However, arbitration agreements subject to Chapter 2 remain 
subject as well to the provisions of Chapter 1, to the extent not in conflict 
with the provisions of Chapter 2 and the New York Convention.192 
For example, section 206 provides for the appointment of arbitrators by a 
court, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, but says nothing about such 
appointment in the absence of agreement.193 Presumably, a court would 
simply look to section 5 of Chapter 1 for such authority194 as a residual 
supplement fully consistent with both Chapter 2 and the New York 
Convention; however, this overlap between Chapters 1 and 2 gives rise to 
potential inconsistencies in standards for setting aside or enforcing awards. 
Chapter 1 provides standards for both confirmation of an award195 and 
setting aside of an award.196 However, these standards are somewhat different 
than those for enforcement contained in the New York Convention and those 
for set-aside contained in most modern arbitration laws.197 As a result, the 
standards for set-aside and enforcement may differ, depending on the 
application of section 10 (and perhaps section 11) to awards governed by the 
                                                 
190
 See supra text accompanying note 176.  
191
 9 U.S.C. § 205. Venue is also provided for in 9 U.S.C. § 204.  
192
 Id. § 208. 
193
 Id. § 206; John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its Implementation Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 90 (2000) (noting that section 206 
addresses appointment only pursuant to the parties’ agreement, thus necessitating resort to 
section 5 in the absence of any agreement). 
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 See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2009). 
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 A private arbitration award is made enforceable through court confirmation 
proceedings. 
196
 An award vacated or set aside by a court with proper jurisdiction is rendered a nullity 
for most purposes. 
197
 In contrast, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial 
Arbitration provides for set aside provisions that essentially mirror the bases for non-
enforcement contained in Article V of the New York Convention. MORRISSEY & GRAVES 
supra note 8, at 462. This was done intentionally in an effort to harmonize the limited bases 
for non-enforcement, whether applied in the context of a set aside proceeding or an 
enforcement proceeding. See Pieter Sander, The History of the New York Convention, in 
IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS 11, 13 (Albert Jan 
Van Den Berg ed., 1999). 
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New York Convention.198 The proper answer to this issue is anything but 
clear. 
Under Chapter 1, section 9, an award is subject to “confirmation” (i.e., 
can be made enforceable) unless subject to being vacated, modified, or 
corrected under sections 10 or 11,199 thus seemingly applying the same 
standards to both set-aside (or vacation) and enforcement (or confirmation) 
under Chapter 1; however, Chapter 2, section 207, provides for “con-
firmation” unless an award would be subject to non-enforcement under the 
New York Convention200 — again, a different set of standards than those 
contained in Chapter 1, section 10.201 If courts interpreting Chapter 2 were 
interested in harmonizing the standards for setting aside and enforcing 
awards, they might reasonably read section 207 broadly and apply these same 
bases for non-enforcement to actions to set aside an award governed by 
Chapter 2. Alas, they generally do not,202 so a legal action addressing the 
viability of an award may be governed by different standards, depending on 
whether it is styled as a “confirmation” action or an action to “set aside” the 
award. The difference may be particularly dramatic to the extent a party may 
seek to have an award set aside based on the “manifest disregard” 
standard.203 
                                                 
198
 For a more thorough examination of the inherent issues arising from the overlap 
between Chapters 1 and 2, see generally Jarred Pinkston, Toward a Uniform Interpretation 
of the Federal Arbitration Act: The Role of 9 U.S.C. § 208 in the Arbitral Statutory Scheme, 
22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 639 (2008). 
199
 9 U.S.C. § 9. 
200
 Id. § 207. 
201
 Bowman, supra note 193, at 98, 107. 
202
 See, e.g., Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
203
 This standard is unique to U.S. law, albeit considerably less certain in application after 
the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street. Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 
576, 584-85 (2008). Circuit courts have split on the question of whether the “manifest 
disregard” basis for setting aside an arbitral award survived the Court’s decision in this case. 
See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93-94 (2nd Cir. 2008), 
rev’d on other grounds, 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010) (holding that the doctrine has survived, but 
noting the contrary view of the First Circuit, and then finding that the standard was not 
satisfied in the instant case). In reversing the Second Circuit decision, the Supreme Court 
analyzed the arbitration panel’s decision under section 10(a)(4) of the FAA, instead of the 
manifest disregard standard. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S.Ct. at 1767-68. However, the Court 
specifically declined to address the question of whether “manifest disregard” had survived 
Hall Street, while simultaneously noting that this standard was also satisfied in the instant 
case. Id. at 1768 fn 3. In any event, the Second Circuit continues to consider the doctrine a 
viable one.  See Matthew v. Papua New Guinea, No. 10-0074, 2010 WL 3784198, at *1-*2 
(2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2010) (explaining when use of the “manifest disregard” standard would be 
appropriate but ultimately finding that “that the Arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the 
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This inconsistency in set-aside and enforcement standards arising from 
the overlap between Chapters 1 and 2 is a perfect example of the problems 
with piecemeal amendment of the FAA and the reasons why a comp-
rehensive new statute governing domestic and international commercial 
arbitration is necessary. In addition to the same inconsistencies presented by 
Chapter 2,204 Chapter 3 also presents its own unique challenge based on its 
overlap with Chapter 1. 
 
b. Arbitration Under the Panama Convention and Its Incorporation 
of a Fully Developed Set of Default Rules 
 
Chapter 3 provides for the application of the Panama Convention to the 
same categories of arbitration agreements governed by Chapter 2, but differs 
in that it only applies when a majority of the parties to the arbitration 
agreement are from signatories to the Panama Convention.205 The Panama 
Convention has been ratified by a significant number of states within the 
Americas (including the United States),206 and will generally govern 
arbitration involving parties from two of these states or arbitration relating to 
a transaction that contemplates performance or enforcement outside of the 
                                                                                                                         
law”). 
In providing its reasoning for continued use of the “manifest disregard” standard, the 
Second Circuit held in its original Stolt-Nielen decision that the doctrine was unaffected by 
the Court’s limitation of review to FAA section 10, because it believed the “manifest 
disregard” doctrine to be grounded in sections 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4). Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d 
at 94-95. Section 10(a)(3) has no direct corollary under the New York Convention, and, 
while Article V1(c) of the Convention bears some similarities to FAA section 10(a)(4), it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any serious suggestion that Article V1(c) 
included the sort of “manifest disregard” standard applied under the FAA. 
204
 Much of Chapter 2, including section 207, is incorporated into Chapter 3, and the 
Inter-American Convention provisions on non-enforcement are identical to those contained 
in the New York Convention. Thus, cases governed by Chapter 3 must address this same 
inconsistency between standards for set aside and enforcement. See, e.g., Banco de Seguros 
Del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684-85 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); 
Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info. Techs., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 
9369, 2003 WL 23641529, at *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003). 
205
 9 U.S.C. § 305.  
206
 Argentina, Boliva, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domincan Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela have all ratified the treaty. Multilateral Treaties: Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration Signatories and Ratifications, ORG. OF 
AM. STATES, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW, http://www.oas.org/juridico/ english/sigs/b-35.html (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
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United States.207 Thus, it has a potentially widespread application to arb-
itration agreements.208 
The Panama Convention is, to some degree, less complete than the New 
York Convention, thus potentially requiring greater supplementation via 
Chapter 1—with one major exception: Article 3 of the Panama Convention 
provides for the application of the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American 
Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC) in the absence of an express 
agreement by the parties.209 “The practical effect of this provision is to 
supply a great deal of arbitration ‘law’ through the Commission rules unless 
the parties otherwise provide.”210 These rules are essentially identical to the 
original UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.211 
Currently, it may be worthwhile at this stage to recall the difference 
between a national law governing arbitration and a set of rules contractually 
agreed upon by the parties by incorporating these rules into their agreement. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is a 
modern law governing international commercial arbitration, while the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules represent a set of rules typically incorporated 
by parties seeking ad hoc arbitration,212 and sometimes used as a model for 
institutional arbitration rules.213 However, there is nothing precluding the use 
                                                 
207
 In fact, based on the statutory language of 9 U.S.C. § 202 (incorporated into Chapter 3 
by § 302), read in combination with § 305, an arbitration agreement in a contract between 
two U.S. businesses, which contemplated performance or potential enforcement abroad—
even in a country not a signatory to the Panama Convention (e.g., in Germany, China, or 
Australia)—would be subject to Chapter 3 and the Panama Convention. Although an 
enforcement action governed by the Panama Convention makes little sense if enforcement is 
likely in a country not a signatory, there is no fundamental reason why an arbitration 
proceeding between two U.S. businesses contemplating performance in Germany could not 
be governed by Chapter 3 of the FAA. The author is not aware of any court or commentator 
who has addressed this issue, but it represents yet another anomaly arising from the 
piecemeal drafting of the FAA. 
208
 For a more thorough examination than that provided herein, see generally Bowman, 
supra note 193 (distinguishing the Panama Convention from the New York Convention). 
209
 Panama Convention, supra note 7, art. 3. 
210
 MACNEIL, ET. AL., supra note 101, § 44.8.2. 
211
 Bowman, supra note 193, at 29. The only meaningful difference is the designation of 
IACAC as the appointing authority in the event that the parties are unable to agree on an 
arbitrator. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 50, at art. 6. Under the UNC-
ITRAL Rules, an appointing authority is designated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
The Hague. Id. 
212
 This is arbitration under a specified set of rules, but without designating an institution 
for purposes of administering the arbitration. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 35.  
213
 See generally, Arbitration Rules of the Chicago International Dispute Resolution 
Association, CHICAGO INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASS’N (July 1, 2005), http://cidra.org/ 
arbrules (providing a list of these rules). 
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of a private set of rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as the 
basis for a legislatively enacted set of default legal rules, as apparently 
enacted in the case of FAA Chapter 3. In fact, private rules and legal rules 
address many of the same issues214—especially those default rules char-
acterized in Part II.A.2, above, as “arbitration procedure” issues, but also 
sometimes including those characterized as “front end” issues.215 It is the 
latter group of default legal rules governing “front end” issues that present 
perhaps the most interesting conflict between Chapter 1 and Chapter 3. 
The bulk of these “front end” issues arises when the parties are unable to 
agree upon the appointment of an arbitrator. As explained above in Part 
II.A.2, FAA Chapter 1 sends the parties to court for appointment of the 
arbitrator.216 In contrast, the IACAC Rules provide for appointment of an 
arbitrator by the IACAC, thereby avoiding any need to resort to court 
proceedings.217 Thus, the default legal rule applicable under Chapter 3—by 
virtue of the application of the Panama Convention and its incorporation of 
the IACAC Rules—fundamentally differs from the default legal rule 
applicable under Chapter 1 on the question of appointment of an arbitrator in 
the absence of party agreement.218 This difference is fundamental because it 
reflects a basic difference between United States law and modern arbitration 
law with respect to court involvement in front end issues. United States law 
reserves “front end” issues for the courts,219 while many modern national 
laws and private rules grant considerable authority to the arbitrators or 
private institutions to address many of these “front end” issues. 
In particular, the vast majority of modern arbitration laws grant 
arbitrators the authority to determine their own jurisdiction under the doctrine 
                                                 
214
 The rules agreed upon by the parties, by way of incorporation, of course take 
precedence over any default legal rules, just as any specific provisions of the arbitration 
agreement, itself, take precedence over the incorporated rules. 
215
 “Back end” issues are rarely addressed in private “rules,” as these more typically 
involve mandatory rather than default legal rules, such as the legal standards for set-aside 
and enforcement. Inasmuch as the parties have no power to vary such legal rules, there is 
little point in adding them to a set of private rules to be incorporated by the parties. 
216
 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006). 
217
 See Bowman, supra note 193, at 32 (pointing out the positive practical effect of 
reducing the need for judicial intervention and the costly delay often associated with such 
proceedings). 
218
 The author is unaware of any court attempting to address this issue under Chapter 3. 
However, other decisions applying Chapter 3 give considerable cause for skepticism. See 
infra note 225. 
219
 See RUAA, supra note 28, pp. 9-31, 35-49 §§ 2-8, 10-14 (including reference to 
involvement of courts in “front-end” issues in specified sections). 
2011]             ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT          261   
       
 
of competence-competence.220 However, FAA Chapter 1 does not. As 
explained in Part II.A.2, section 4 provides that the basic jurisdictional 
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate must be decided by the 
court.221 While the United States Supreme Court has now seemingly clarified 
that the parties may contractually grant the arbitral tribunal the power to 
decide its own jurisdiction,222 such a contractual right is not equivalent to a 
statutory grant of competence-competence.223 Thus, the incorporation of the 
IACAC Rules via the recognition of the Panama Convention in Chapter 3 is 
quite significant, because Article 21 of these rules provides for competence-
competence.224 
By incorporating Article 21, FAA Chapter 3 has effectively provided for 
statutory competence-competence, a provision quite typical in modern 
arbitration law outside of the U.S., but quite unique in U.S. arbitration law. 
Unfortunately, this “uniqueness” has apparently led at least one court to fail 
miserably in its attempt to interpret and apply FAA Chapter 3 and its 
incorporation of the IACAC Rules.225 In fairness, the problem faced by 
                                                 
220
 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, art. 16. 
221
 See supra Part II.A.2. 
222
 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); see First Options of 
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995). 
223
 The problem is largely one of circularity. Under a contractual approach to 
competence-competence, any power to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate must 
come from the agreement to arbitrate itself. In contrast, a statutory grant of competence-
competence is not dependent on the parties’ agreement, thus, to at least some degree, 
avoiding this problem of circularity. The significant problems with contractual competence-
competence are more fully addressed infra Part II.D. 
224
 IACAC Rules, supra note 116, art. 21(1) and (2). 
225
 See Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 25 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475-76 (Del. 1998) (giving effect 
to section 4 of Chapter 1 over the incorporation of Article 21 of the IACAC Rules under 
Chapter 3). The court first determined, somewhat inexplicably, that case law under FAA 
Chapter 1 was not “in conflict” with the Panama Convention. Id. at 475. Thus, the provisions 
of Chapter 1 were not superseded by Chapter 3. It is hard to see how one could support such 
an assertion, and the court does not. However, its analysis is also interesting for its 
remarkable preference for case law over a clear and unambiguous statutory provision. The 
court goes on to suggest that a statute should not be read to differ from a common law result, 
absent a clear and unequivocal imperative required from the nature of the enactment. Id. at 
476. Finding no express intent to change the common law (notwithstanding the express 
intent in Chapter 3 to give effect to the Panama Convention), the court declines to give effect 
to the clear and unequivocal language of Chapter 3, the Panama Convention, and the IACAC 
Rules. Finally, the court seemingly characterizes FAA Chapter 1, section 4, as a mandatory 
rule of law (citing Article 1(2) of the IACAC Rules, which states that such rules are subject 
to mandatory rules of law), while simultaneously citing First Options, which clearly suggests 
that section 4 is not a mandatory rule of law, but one that even parties can contract around. 
Id. at 476; see also Bowman, supra note 193, at 140-49 (providing its own critical analysis 
of the court’s decision). 
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courts attempting to interpret and apply Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA is one 
of attempting to reconcile substantially different bodies of arbitration law on 
a number of fundamental issues. Under such circumstances, perhaps it should 
not be surprising that courts are often not up to the challenge. 
Ultimately, the FAA provides solid footing for the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements to the extent the parties provide the details of such 
agreements. However, the FAA provides little more than bare skeletal 
provisions beyond its basic pro-enforcement bias. Moreover, the integration 
of the original act with the enabling legislation supporting the enforcement of 
the relevant international conventions has added further challenges and 
confusion to the growing common law body of United States arbitration 
law.226 
One suggested solution to the current confusion and inconsistencies 
found in United States law governing international commercial arbitration is 
a new “restatement” of this law.227 Normally, the idea of “restating” a statute 
would seem to be logically inconsistent with the basic nature of a statute.228 
In this case, however, the very idea of “restating” the United States law 
governing international commercial arbitration demonstrates the inadequacy 
of the current statutory scheme—as a statute. In effect, this obsolete, 
inadequate, and often inconsistent statute has largely been displaced by 
federal common law.229 Thus, it might be useful to ask the more basic 
question of whether any arbitration—domestic or international—should be 
governed by common law. 
                                                 
226George A. Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration, 
42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 176 (2009) (noting commercial arbitration is “an area of 
the law needing clarification”). 
227
 Id. (arguing the publishing of the new Restatement in this area will clarify aspects of 
U.S. arbitration law and judicial precedents). 
228
 The author is by no means questioning the need to do “something” to improve the 
current state of the law in this area or the qualifications of the extraordinary group of 
individuals assigned to perform the task, but simply the concept of “restating” law 
purportedly governed by a statute. For example, it seems unlikely that anyone would ever 
suggest a “restatement” of the law governing the sale of goods, because sales of goods are 
governed in the United States by U.C.C. Article 2, unless displaced in certain cross-border 
transactions by the CISG—each fully developed coherent statutes. 
229
 It is this odd mix of statutory metamorphosis in conjunction with international 
conventions—now largely overtaken by federal common law—that gives rise to the need for 
such a restatement. Notably, restating the law governing international commercial arbitration 
is apparently proving to be an unexpectedly difficult task. See Bermann, supra note 226, at 
175 (noting “already a number of difficult, and to some extent unexpectedly difficult, 
questions have arisen” in the development of a restatement). 
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B. Gap Filling Under Federal Law by Courts or Legislators: Is It Time To 
Amend or Replace the FAA, or Should We Leave the Job to the Courts? 
 
Many of the gaps in the FAA have been filled by court decisions, 
including numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. In fact, these Supreme 
Court decisions have seemingly left the actual language and intent of the 
statute far behind.230 As a result, what we have today is arguably a body of 
federal common law governing arbitration. Assuming one agrees with this 
assertion, one might next reasonably ask whether this is a good thing. 
Professor Rau acknowledges that arbitration in the United States is 
governed today by federal common law,231 but suggests this common law 
approach provides good reasons to leave the FAA alone rather than amend 
it.232 Rau acknowledges some of the standard rationales one hears in 
opposition to amending the FAA, including the notion that any attempt to 
tinker in any way with the FAA will open the proverbial “Pandora’s box” of 
various special interests and vexing issues.233 But Rau focuses primarily on 
his asserted belief that courts are more likely than legislators to “get it right” 
and provides numerous examples of what he believes to be particularly 
grievous examples of proposed statutory solutions to various issues arising in 
arbitration.234 
This focus on poor drafting and flawed reasoning might miss the mark. 
After all, it is likely that even Professor Rau would acknowledge the plethora 
of badly reasoned and poorly drafted court decisions on arbitration—though 
perhaps suggesting that a bad court decision is easier to fix than a bad statute. 
Presumably, one can find excellent examples of both judicial and statutory 
draftsmanship if one looks in the right places, and this is arguably the 
aspirational standard. If so, then this might lead one to ask if there is some 
basis other than institutional competence for determining whether arbitration 
                                                 
230
 See Moses, supra note 92, at 99. 
231
 See Rau, supra note 46, at 202. In effect, Professor Rau suggests that, by definition, a 
common law statute can never contain a “gap” inasmuch as such gaps are filled by decisional 
common law. Id. Thus, apparently, the “bare-bones” FAA is fully fleshed out if we simply 
know how to view it properly. Of course, it could also be said that any civil law statute, by 
definition, contains no gaps, inasmuch as any apparent gaps are simply filled by looking to 
the general principles underlying the statutory enactment. However, that misses the issue, 
which is whether the actual express provisions of the FAA are sufficiently well developed to 
provide useful guidance as a set of default legal rules governing arbitration. 
232
 Id. at 169. 
233
 Id. at 170. 
234
 Id. at 169-82. 
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ought to be governed by a comprehensive statute or a comprehensive body of 
common law cases. 
On this point, Professor Rau explains his basic preference for the 
common law, as an incremental and dynamic means of developing the law,235 
and one could debate this question at length based on the relative advantages 
and disadvantages of common law versus statutory legal regimes.236 How-
ever, it is important to remember that this is a very specific sort of contract—
an agreement to resolve disputes by arbitration—and not by court 
adjudication. As such, it would seem that the parties’ intent ought to inform 
the determination of an appropriate legal regime. 
At a bare minimum, the parties to a binding arbitration agreement have 
expressed their intent to resolve their dispute through final and binding 
arbitration. Assuming that the arbitration agreement says nothing more, it 
can, at the very least, be inferred that these same parties intended not to go to 
court.237 Thus, the very idea of using appellate court cases to construct a body 
of law to govern their relationship is antithetical to the notion of arbitration. 
Certainly, there will always be parties who overreach in attempting to take a 
dispute to arbitration when it belongs in the courts, and there will always be 
recalcitrant parties who attempt to avoid arbitration—notwithstanding an 
earlier agreement to use it for dispute settlement. Courts will also likely 
remain necessary for certain forms of specific relief.238 However, these 
occasions on which the parties must resort to the courts should be the ex-
ceptions, and they certainly should not be the lifeblood of the law governing 
an agreement not to go to court. 
Professor Rau correctly points out that arbitration is ultimately based on 
the consent of the parties.239 As such, the parties’ consent to arbitration must, 
                                                 
235
 See id. at 199, 202-03 (showing support for the common law as a principled and 
accretional method for developing law). 
236
 One might even go further with this analysis by comparing common law and civil law 
based legal systems. 
237
 A positive choice of final and binding arbitration is also a negative rejection of court 
adjudication. Cf. Julian Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the International 
Arbitration Process? 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 491 (2009) (saying that while parties to 
an international transaction may have additional reasons to avoid national courts, the parties’ 
implied rejection of court adjudication by choosing private arbitration is equally clear in a 
domestic transaction).  
238
 Stephen P. Bedell & Louis K. Ebling, Equitable Relief in Arbitration: A Survey of 
American Caselaw, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 40, 79 (1988) (noting the impossibility for 
arbitration to grant recission and reformation or to provide relief not explicitly contracted for 
in the arbitration agreement).  
239
 Rau, supra note 46, at 204. 
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at some point, be subject to judicial determination if disputed.240 However, 
this determination need not be required as a threshold matter (or even 
necessarily permitted as a full judicial determination) prior to the constitution 
of the tribunal and completion of the full arbitral process—including a 
jurisdictional determination by the arbitrators.241 Moreover, courts should be 
a last resort, because when the parties go to court, many of the specific 
benefits they sought in choosing arbitration in the first place are lost. 
The parties’ preference for confidentiality is typically lost with the first 
court proceeding, as their private dispute suddenly becomes public.242 The 
parties’ preference for an expert decision maker is lost to the extent their 
arbitration agreement may be subject not only to a court review, but to a jury 
determination.243 Perhaps most significantly, the parties’ desire for a prompt, 
efficient resolution of their dispute on the merits is completely lost in a 
painfully long process of court determinations—potentially including an 
appellate process to the highest level—before any decision maker ever has a 
chance to hear the merits of the underlying dispute.244 Whatever one’s pref-
erence for the common law, it flies in the face of basic common sense to 
                                                 
240
 Id. at 204-05. In fact, it is under the FAA that this obvious point has been called into 
serious question. In First Options, the Supreme Court seemingly provided that the parties 
could vest the arbitrators with the power to determine their own jurisdiction—just as they 
can vest the arbitrators with the power to decide the merits of their dispute. See First Options 
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (suggesting that an arbitrator’s decision on 
jurisdiction, if mandated by the parties’ agreement, should be treated essentially the same on 
review as a decision on the merits). However, such questions on the merits are not subject to 
appellate review, so one might reasonably ask whether, under this Court-developed doctrine 
of contractual competence-competence, a court would ever have the power to review the 
basic question of whether the parties agreed to arbitration. The Court’s recent decision in 
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), seems only to confirm and add 
to these concerns and is discussed more fully infra Part II.E. 
241
 Under many arbitration regimes, the arbitrators not only have the authority to 
determine their own jurisdiction, but, in many instances, a court is precluded from con-
ducting any more than a prima facie inquiry prior to the arbitrators’ determination. See John 
J. Barcelo, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and Competence-
Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1115, 1124-30 
(2003). Any subsequent review may be informed by the arbitrators’ analysis (even though it 
is not binding in any way on a reviewing court), and the issue may never arise, depending on 
the outcome of the arbitration proceedings on the merits (the party bringing a claim in 
arbitration would, of course, have no basis to contest the arbitrators’ jurisdiction over the 
claim). 
242
 Arbitration proceedings are private, and parties are often bound to strict 
confidentiality requirements. In contrast, court proceedings are a matter of public record. 
243
 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Whatever one’s views as to juries, the parties’ intent to refer 
disputes to an expert decision maker would seem contrary. 
244
 This is the most significant complaint expressed by business users of arbitration today. 
See supra Part I. 
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require parties to sacrifice the most fundamental benefits of their bargains in 
order to learn the content of those bargains. Yet, this is exactly what 
transpires when parties must go to court—and to appellate courts—in order 
to learn the default rules governing final and binding arbitration. 
In the case of an agreement to final and binding arbitration, the parties’ 
expectations are best served by a complete and comprehensive statutory 
scheme—not a piecemeal series of attempts to patch together an aging 
statute—but a complete and comprehensive statute, drafted to reflect 
normative commercial arbitration practices and the expectations of the 
business community. If, however, one agrees with this proposition, this does 
not end the inquiry, as legislation might be provided at either a state or 
federal level.245 The potential for providing default legal rules governing 
arbitration under state law is explored next. 
 
C. What About State Law? 
 
Arbitration may also—at least potentially—be governed by state law, and 
virtually every state has enacted a statute of some sort governing 
arbitration.246 The following states have general arbitration statutes that 
follow the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956 (UAA): Arkansas; Delaware; 
Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Maine; Maryland; Mass-
achusetts; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; South Carolina; South Dakota; 
Tennessee; Virginia; and Wyoming.247 This Act addresses most of the same 
issues addressed by the FAA, but also adds provisions addressing a few 
                                                 
245
 For example, U.C.C. Article 2, discussed supra at Part I.C, is a model statute enacted 
at the state level. 
246
 In fact, the Uniform Arbitration Act dates back to 1955, and, by the year 2000, forty-
nine states had arbitration acts. RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note (2000). 
247
 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-201 to 16-7-224 (2007); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-
5725 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 7-901 to 7-922 (2007); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-5/23 
(2007); IND. CODE §§ 34-57-2-1 to 34-57-2-22 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679A.1-
679A.19 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 5-401 to 5-422 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
417.045-417.240 (LexisNexis 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (2007); 
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (LexisNexis 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350-435.470 
(West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to 27-5-324 (2007); NEB. Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 
25-2601 to 25-2622 (LexisNexis 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to 15-48-240 (2007); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25A-1 to 21-25A-38 (2007); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to 
29-5-320 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-577 to 8.01-581.16 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 
1-36-101 to 1-36-119 (2007). 
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procedural issues ignored by the FAA, as well as an additional specific 
ground for vacating an award where there was no agreement to arbitrate.248 
The following states have not explicitly adopted the UAA, but their 
arbitration statutes include provisions very similar to the UAA: Connecticut; 
Florida; New Hampshire; Ohio; Pennsylvania; Texas; and Vermont.249 The 
Mississippi Code looks particularly similar to the UAA; however, it does 
seem to add more provisions than the UAA.250 For example, it adds a Notice 
to Parties provision and the Code goes more into detail on the role of 
arbitrators.251 Michigan has adopted many of the same provisions as the 
UAA, but has taken a rather unique approach in getting there. The actual 
statute includes a general provision on enforceability, a provision for court 
appointment of an arbitrator, and provisions on court jurisdiction and venue, 
but little else of obvious consequence.252 However, section 5021 directs the 
reader to the rules of the Michigan Supreme Court,253 which include a 
number of provisions on procedure, as well as confirmation, vacation, or 
modification—much like those of the UAA.254 Of course, by including such 
provisions in the court rules, the legislature has delegated the power to amend 
these rules to the Michigan Supreme Court.255 
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 See generally UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25 (1956). More specifically, section 
12(a)(5) provides for vacation of an award where the arbitrators themselves (and not the 
court) determined the parties had agreed to arbitrate and did so over an objection by the party 
seeking vacation, and the reviewing court determines that the parties did not agree to 
arbitrate the dispute. Id. at § 12(a)(5). This provision would seem to avoid the challenges 
presented by the Supreme Court’s dicta in First Options, suggesting a more deferential 
standard of review under such circumstances. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 
U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (suggesting that an arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction, if mandated by 
the parties’ agreement, should be treated essentially the same on review as a decision on the 
merits). However, one might ask if this “solution” to the First Options problem somehow 
makes the statute less “pro-arbitration,” in which case it would likely be preempted by the 
FAA. 
249
 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to 52-424 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 
682.01-682.22 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-542:11 (2007); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-2711.16 (LexisNexis 2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301-
7320 (West 2007); TEX CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. §§ 171.001-171.098 (West 2007); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5641-5681 (2007). 
250
 MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1 to 11-15-37 (2007). 
251
 Id. §§ 11-15-5, 11-15-7. 
252
 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001-600.5035 (West 2007). 
253
 See Id. § 600.5021 (stating that “[t]he arbitration shall be conducted in accordance 
with the rules of the supreme court”). 
254
 See MICH. CT. R. 3.602. Rule 3.602 further cross-references the reader to the standard 
rule of civil procedure for subpoenas. See id. at (F)(1). 
255
 See MICH. CT. R. 1.201. One could reasonably ask if this might be a more transparent 
and predictable approach than that of the United States Supreme Court in periodically 
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The following states have general arbitration statutes that follow the 
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA): Alaska; Arizona; Colorado; 
Hawaii; Minnesota; Nevada; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Carolina; 
North Dakota; Oklahoma; Oregon; Utah; and Washington.256 Even though 
the following states have not explicitly adopted the Revised Uniform 
Arbitration Act, their statutory provisions are extremely similar to those of 
the RUAA: California; Georgia; and Rhode Island.257 Wisconsin has adopted 
an extremely detailed arbitration statute and, more specifically, an explicit set 
of default provisions.258 
The Louisiana statute largely mirrors the FAA, while adding a few 
provisions similar to those found in the UAA.259 Perhaps of more interest in 
relation to the issues explored by this Article in Part I.D, the Louisiana statute 
is extraordinarily unique in its placement. While found within Revised 
Statutes, it has been placed in a section specifically addressing “Code 
Ancillaries,” and within that section, among various forms of nominate 
contracts. In effect, Louisiana law treats arbitration as a civil code based 
nominate contract.260 
The remaining states have arbitration statutes that are arguably even more 
minimalist in nature than the FAA. The Alabama Code focuses primarily on 
the arbitrators and a few procedural matters but does not even clearly state 
that ex ante arbitration clauses are enforceable.261 West Virginia’s statute 
                                                                                                                         
defining or redefining the contours of the FAA. 
256
 RUAA, supra note 28; ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.300-09.43.595 (2007); COLO. REV. 
STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to 13-22-223 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658A-1 to 658A-29 (West 
2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.206-38.248 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 
2A:23B-1 to 2A:23B-32 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 to 44-7A-32 (West 
2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1 to 1-569.31 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.3-01 to 
32.29.3-29 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1851-1881 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
36.600-36.740 (West 2007); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 78B-11-101 to 78B-11-131 (LexisNexis 
2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.101-7.04.220 (West 2007). Arizona and Minnesota 
enacted these statutes in 2010. See H.R. 2430, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010), 
available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/hb2430h.pdf; H.R. 1692, 86th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/ data/revisor/law/ 2010/ 
0/2010-264.pdf. The District of Columbia has also adopted RUAA. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-
4401 to 16-4432 (2001). 
257
 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to 9-9-
18 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to 10-3-21 (2007). 
258
 WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01-788.18 (West 2007). 
259
 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-9:4217 (2007). 
260
 As noted supra at note 86, the Québec Civil Code treats arbitration in a similar 
manner. 
261
 ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to 6-6-16 (2007). 
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addresses even fewer issues than Alabama’s and clearly applies only to ex 
post submissions of controversies.262 The New York statute addresses basic 
questions of enforceability, motions to compel or stay proceedings, a few 
procedural matters, and grounds for vacation of an award.263 However, the 
statute is remarkably minimalist for a state where the most well-known 
American arbitration institution makes its home,264 and many complex 
commercial cases are undoubtedly arbitrated. 
Notwithstanding the current menagerie of state laws described above, one 
might reasonably suggest that—whatever the deficiencies in the FAA—the 
gaps in federal law could be filled by uniform state law instead of federal 
law. In fact, this was one of the primary objectives behind the relatively 
recent revision and promulgation of the RUAA.265 
 
1. The RUAA as an Attempt To Fill Gaps in the Federal Arbitration Act 
and Provide Default Legal Rules Under State Law 
 
The prefatory note to the RUAA points out that, while effective in 
ensuring the enforceability of arbitration agreements, earlier state law had 
failed to address many issues arising in modern arbitration agreements266—
much as the FAA has ensured enforceability of arbitration agreements but 
failed to address many of the issues arising in modern arbitration agreements. 
The RUAA was expressly intended to provide a “default mechanism if the 
parties do not have a specific agreement on a particular issue.”267 While the 
drafters realized that “front end” and “back end” issues might well be 
preempted by the FAA, the RUAA was intended primarily to address default 
legal rules governing “arbitration procedure,” which are virtually non-
existent within the FAA.268 
Ten years after its completion, the RUAA has only been adopted by 
fourteen states and the District of Columbia.269 It is, thus, questionable 
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 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to 55-10-8 (West 2007). Arguably, one might reason-
ably suggest that this is not an arbitration statute at all, inasmuch as it does not even hint at 
addressing ex ante arbitration agreements. 
263
 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-7514 (MCKINNEY 2007). 
264
 AAA Offices: Headquarters and Departments, AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC’N, http:// 
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29067 (“1633 Broadway, 10th Floor, New York, New York 10019”) 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2011). 
265
 RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note. 
266
 Id. 
267
 Id. 
268
 Id.; see supra Part II.A.2 for a definitional explanation of “front end” issues, “back 
end” issues, and “arbitration procedure.” 
269
 A Few Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF 
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whether it is realistic to assume that the RUAA could serve to provide any 
“uniform” default legal rules governing even “arbitration procedure” any 
time in the near future. The reasons for this somewhat lackluster performance 
may be manifold, but the following two possibilities come to mind. 
First, the actual provisions of the RUAA have been the subject of 
significant criticism. Professor Rau frequently points to the drafting of the 
RUAA in his efforts to suggest that legislators (even private legislators) are 
less competent than courts to provide legal rules governing arbitration, and in 
doing so points out particular specific problems with the statute.270 The 
RUAA also attempts to address the broad array of existing arbitration 
agreements, including consumer and employee arbitration but fails to remedy 
many of the failures of the FAA in this respect.271 More importantly for the 
focus of this Article on business-to-business arbitration, one of the advisors 
to the drafting committee levels a more general criticism, suggesting that the 
default procedural rules within the RUAA are more consistent with lawyers’ 
views of traditional litigation than with business attitudes regarding the 
virtues of arbitration.272 To be sure, the RUAA also has its proponents and 
believers.273 However, it has failed to achieve the sort of broad acceptance 
normally associated with a “uniform” state law. 
Second, the extent of FAA preemption is anything but certain. While the 
drafters of the RUAA assumed that the FAA did not preempt state procedural 
rules, as long as such rules were pro-arbitration, the extent of FAA 
preemption remains to a large degree unresolved. The FAA unquestionably 
has broad preemptive force in displacing state laws governing arbitration.274 
While some continue to urge a significant role for state law, such as the 
RUAA,275 and a more limited view of preemption, the issue remains subject 
                                                                                                                         
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, , available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearch 
Results.aspx (last visited on Mar. 27, 2011). 
270
 See Rau, supra note 46, at 170-79. 
271
 See Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Is It the Wrong Cure? 
4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 12 (2002). 
272
 See Hayford, supra note 44, at 437-39. Professor Hayford is specifically singled out as 
one of the major contributors, as a member of the RUAA drafting committee. RUAA, supra 
note 28, at Prefatory Note. 
273
 Roger Alford, Report to Law Revision Commission Regarding Recommendations for 
Changes to California Arbitration Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2003). 
274
 See Rau, supra note 46, at 192.  
275
 See generally Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A 
State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002); Jill I. Gross’, Over-
Preemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004) 
(suggesting a role for state law, even on “back end” issues). 
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to significant questions.276 In the face of such uncertainty, the only effective 
way to provide for default legal rules is through new federal law.277 
 
2. Additional Challenges in Looking to State Law for Default Legal Rules 
 
In addition to the challenges addressed above, there may be an even more 
fundamental reason why state law cannot reasonably serve as the foundation 
for a system of default legal rules governing arbitration. It is worth recalling 
that default rules are most needed when the parties have drafted a relatively 
minimalist agreement. Such a minimalist agreement may arise from the 
parties’ ignorance regarding many of the more nuanced issues that may arise 
in arbitration and may often be a product of the parties’ desire to avoid 
focusing on dispute resolution when negotiating a business transaction.278 
Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely that a party would include a 
clause expressly choosing the arbitration law of a particular state. 
A general choice-of-law provision will not typically determine the law 
governing the parties’ arbitration agreement.279 Thus, the parties must, in 
some manner, provide a specific choice of law with respect to their 
arbitration agreement if such agreement is to be governed by state law rather 
than the FAA.280 However, it seems unlikely that a typical business party 
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 See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 411-15 (raising doubts about the 
application of state law default rules in the face of broad FAA preemption). 
277
 See Timothy J. Heinsz, The 2000 Revision to the Uniform Act: A Harbinger? 3 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L.J. 435, 435-36 (2003) (suggesting that, because of the preemptive effect of 
the FAA, new federal law is the only way to address fully its many inadequacies). 
278
 See supra Part I.A. 
279
 The arbitration agreement is separable (or severable) from and fully independent of 
the parties’ broader transaction. As such, a general choice-of-law provision is typically 
deemed to govern only that broader transaction and not the arbitration agreement. 
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Bermann, supra note 5, 
at 1018. But see Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989) (inexplicably 
applying California law based on a general choice of law provision in the parties’ contract, 
and never expressly overruled by subsequent precedent more in line with the general rule). 
Notwithstanding the anomalous result in Volt, few, if any, would suggest that a court should 
apply state law to an arbitration agreement based solely on a general choice-of-law provision 
in the parties’ contract. 
280
 In the absence of any express choice, an arbitration agreement is almost universally 
governed by the law of the place of arbitration—the lex arbitri. Bermann, supra note 5, at 
1018-19. Thus, one might reasonably ask if the choice of a particular state as the place of 
arbitration also amounts to a choice of that state’s arbitration law. See Jack Garvey & Totten 
Heffelfinger, Towards Federalizing U.S. International Commercial Arbitration Law, 25 
INT’L LAW 209, 216 (1991) (raising the same uncertain question almost twenty years ago). 
However, as a matter of practice, courts give virtually no analysis to the issue and simply 
apply the FAA. Id. at 1018-22. Presumably, the broad preemptive effect of the FAA gives 
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would be aware of such a need. Moreover, an express choice of law 
governing an arbitration agreement would seemingly suggest to one’s 
contracting partner that disputes arising out of the contemplated transaction 
may be likely. Finally, the very notion of choosing law to govern arbitration, 
a largely private dispute resolution procedure, may be counter-intuitive to the 
typical business person—no matter how important that choice may later 
prove to be. As such, it seems that state arbitration law—even if otherwise 
perfectly suitable—would rarely, if ever, apply to govern the parties’ 
arbitration agreement when they most need default legal rules. 
Moreover, the decision of the United States Supreme Court, in Volt,281 
highlights the uncertainty in choosing state law. Whether a question of the 
effect of a choice-of-law provision or the effect of FAA preemption,282 the 
parties’ attempt to invoke state law will often lead them back to federal court 
for an answer to these questions. Thus, their intent to arbitrate their disputes 
and stay away from the courthouse is once again undermined. 
 
3. State Laws Governing International Arbitration 
 
Thirteen states have adopted specific laws governing international 
commercial arbitration, and eight of these states have, to varying degrees, 
based these statutes on the UNCITRAL Model Law.283 These state law 
formulations governing international commercial arbitration also suffer many 
of the same challenges discussed above, including federal preemption and the 
                                                                                                                         
rise to a presumption that the FAA governs, as the lex arbitri, rather than any otherwise 
applicable state law. See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 411-15 (expressing 
doubt regarding the implied intent reflected in the choice of a place of arbitration as 
sufficient to amount to a choice of state default rules). At the very least, the current state of 
jurisprudence on choice of law governing arbitration gives rise to considerable uncertainty. 
281
 489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also discussion of case cited supra note 279. 
282
 See supra Part II.C.1. 
283
 RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note (indicating that twelve states have enacted 
specialized provisions regarding international commercial arbitration, of which seven have 
based these enactments largely upon the UNCITRAL Model Law; however, Florida’s 2010 
enactment in the following list adds one more state to this list). The UNCITRAL Model Law 
serves, to a large degree, as the basis for the statutes adopted by California, Connecticut, 
Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§§1287.12-1297.337 (Deering 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a-100 to 50a-139 (2010); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 684.0001-684.0048 (LexisNexis 2010); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/1-5  
to 30/25-30 (LexisNexis2010); LA. REV.STAT. §§ 9:4241-9:4276 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 
1-567.31 to 1-567.67 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450-36.558 (2010); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. §§ 172.001-172.175 (West 2010). 
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necessity of some sort of specific choice of state arbitration law by the 
parties—as well as all of the uncertainties present therein. However, the 
adoptions of the Model Law raise some additional issues worth mentioning 
briefly. 
Unlike the RUAA, the UNCITRAL Model Law is a complete modern 
law governing all aspects of arbitration, from commencement through final 
award, including actions for set aside or enforcement.284 As such, its 
complete adoption285 raises far more potential conflicts with the FAA than 
the RUAA. In addition to the provisions on “arbitration procedure,”286 the 
Model Law provisions on “back end” and “front end” issues differ 
significantly from the FAA. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law, like the New York Convention, includes 
different bases for set aside or non-enforcement than those contained in FAA 
section 10.287 Inasmuch as section 10 has been deemed to be a mandatory 
legal rule rather than default provisions,288 the likelihood of preemption 
seems far greater.289 At the front end of the arbitral process, the Model Law 
provides for statutory competence-competence, in direct contrast to FAA 
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 RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note. 
285
 Not all of the eight states utilizing the Model Law as the basis for their own legislation 
adopted all of its provisions. However, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana and Oregon 
substantially adopted the Model Law in its entirety. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-100 to 
50a-139; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.0001-684.0048; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4241-9:4276; 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36.450-36.558, and all eight of these states have adopted the Model 
Law provisions on competence-competence (the jurisdiction of the tribunal to rule on its own 
jurisdiction). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1287.161; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50a-116; FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 684.0001-684.0017; 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/15-5; LA. REV. STAT. § 
9:4256; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.484; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & 
REM. CODE ANN. § 172.001-172.082. 
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 While different than those contained in RUAA, the Model Law procedural provisions 
raise the same sort of preemption issues as RUAA. 
287
 While different from section 10 of the FAA, the Model Law and New York Con-
vention contain essentially identical provisions for both. Model Law Article 36 is identical to 
New York Convention Article V on enforcement issues, and Model Law Article 34 differs 
only in terms of the applicable law on the final two bases for set aside. The latter two bases 
address subject matter arbitrability (not to be confused with the broad misuse of the term by 
the U.S. Supreme Court) and public policy, each applying the law of the place of 
enforcement in actions to enforce and the place of arbitration in actions to set aside an award. 
288
 See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (precluding the parties from 
agreeing to expanded judicial review by holding that such review was statutorily limited to 
those grounds listed in section 10). 
289
 In fact, one might reasonably infer that the California, Illinois, and Texas legislatures 
consciously omitted Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law addressing set aside 
and enforcement based on their likely preemption by the FAA. North Carolina’s approach is 
more curious, inasmuch as it appears to add its own grounds for set aside, different from 
either the FAA or Model Law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46. 
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section 4.290 Under section 4, a court must first decide any issue as to whether 
the parties agreed to arbitration, whereas Model Law Article 16 grants the 
arbitrators the power to make this determination.291 It is now clear that 
section 4 is far less of a mandatory rule of law than section 10, as section 4 
may yield to a “clear and unmistakable” contrary choice by the parties to 
delegate jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrators.292 However, section 4 of 
the FAA is much less likely to defer to state law, as the issue is unequivocally 
one governed by “‘substantive federal arbitration law.’”293 
Lastly, it is worth recalling the discussion in Part II.A.3.b regarding 
Chapter 3 of the FAA and its incorporation of the IACAC Rules, which are 
themselves based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. While the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are, in many ways, quite similar to the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, they are not in fact the same. Thus, an arbitration 
agreement governed by Chapter 3 under the FAA, but perhaps subject to a 
state adoption of the Model Law based on the parties’ express choice, would 
likely present some particularly challenging preemption questions, along with 
the previously discussed issues relating to conflicts between FAA Chapter 1 
and Chapter 3.294 
Thus, any state law attempting to remedy the deficiencies in the FAA 
regarding international commercial arbitration is even more likely to raise 
preemption issues and questions giving rise to uncertainty in the arbitral 
process, thus presenting an even greater likelihood of judicial involvement. 
The role of the FAA in United States arbitration is far too central to simply 
work around it. For effective legal reform, the menagerie of the FAA and its 
considerable body of federal common law must be replaced by a single, new, 
comprehensive statute. However, one final question remains. Are default 
legal rules truly needed, or can private rules adopted by the parties serve the 
same purpose? 
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 See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, at art. 16. 
291
 Id. 
292
 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995) (explaining that 
the parties may ask the arbitrators to decide this issue just like any other issue they might 
assign to the arbitrators). 
293
 Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 n.4 (2010). This issue is 
more fully discussed in Part II.E below. 
294
 See supra Part II.A.3.b. 
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D. Can Institutional and Other Private Rules Serve as a Substitute for 
Default Legal Rules? 
 
One might reasonably question whether there is any need for a set of 
default legal rules to govern arbitration agreements in view of the broad and 
easy availability of institutional and ad hoc rules295 from which parties may 
choose.296 However, the parties may fail to choose any rules. As indicated 
earlier, the only requirement for an effective arbitration agreement is a 
written agreement to final and binding resolution of a defined set of 
disputes.297 Admittedly, the concern expressed earlier about sending negative 
signals to one’s contracting partner by negotiating over dispute resolution298 
may not be as acute with respect to selecting a set of rules. There is obviously 
a substantial difference between including fifteen pages of detailed 
arbitration procedures and agreeing to arbitrate under a well-known set of 
institutional rules, which happen themselves to be fifteen pages long. 
However, there may remain other reasons why parties fail to include a set of 
rules in their arbitration agreement. 
The parties may be attempting to save money by omitting any 
institutional reference. In fact, this is exactly why parties sometimes choose 
ad hoc over institutional arbitration.299 However, parties and their attorneys 
may or may not be aware of the existence of ad hoc rules, detached from the 
use of a particular arbitral institution. Thus, a party seeking to avoid dispute 
resolution in court, but hesitant to commit to the costs of institutional 
arbitration and unaware of the existence of ad hoc rules, might very well 
propose arbitration without designating any rules at all. Again, it is important 
to remember that not all contracts that include arbitration clauses are drafted 
by lawyers. Thus, it is quite likely there will always be a significant 
minority300 of arbitration agreements that do not include any designation of 
rules. 
Moreover, there is nothing inconsistent with parallel sets of (1) default 
legal rules and (2) private rules for autonomous incorporation into parties’ 
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 Ad hoc rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, are typically used in the 
absence of institutional administration of the arbitration proceedings. 
296
 See, e.g., Rau, supra note 46, at 180 (suggesting, in the context of international 
commercial arbitration, that the vast majority of parties to arbitration agreements designate 
either a set of institutional or ad hoc rules). 
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 See supra Part I.A. 
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 See supra Part I.A. 
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 MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 330. 
300
 For purposes of this Article, the author is willing to concede this is likely a minority, 
though an empirical analysis might be interesting—assuming one could actually sample 
small business agreements, as well as large. 
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contracts. By way of comparative example, parties to a sale of goods can 
easily designate INCOTERMS 2000301 (or some other set of trade terms) to 
govern various issues involving shipping and passage of risk (much like 
parties to an arbitration agreement can designate a set of institutional rules). 
However, UCC Article 2 also provides a set of default provisions addressing 
these same issues in the event the parties do not—precisely in order to avoid 
later disputes over omitted terms. 
Lastly, there are certain terms that simply do not work effectively based 
on autonomous choice, whether based on the parties’ own terms or their 
incorporation of a set of arbitration rules, because of inherent flaws involving 
circularity. The most classic example of this problem involves the doctrine of 
competence-competence, or the power of an arbitral tribunal to determine its 
own jurisdiction. 
 
E. The Problem with Contractual Competence-Competence 
 
FAA section 4 provides that a court must decide any question of whether 
the parties agreed to arbitration of the dispute in question.302 In contrast, most 
modern arbitration laws grant the arbitral tribunal the power to make this 
determination itself, deciding its own jurisdiction—though solely as an initial 
matter, and fully subject to later (or concurrent)303 court review within a 
limited statutory framework.304 However, one might reasonably ask whether, 
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 See Incoterms 2010, supra note 67. 
302
 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). 
303
 See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, at art. 8 (providing for the 
possibility of concurrent jurisdictional determinations by the arbitral tribunal and a proper 
court). 
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 See, e.g., id. at art. 16 (granting the arbitrators the authority to determine their own 
jurisdiction); id. at art. 34, 36 (providing for court review in an action to set aside or enforce 
any award—but only on certain enumerated grounds, one of which is that the parties did not 
agree to arbitration of the dispute in question). While the doctrine of competence-
competence operates differently in different legal systems as to “timing” (as to determ-
inations by courts or arbitrators), the doctrine has gained near universal acceptance in 
international practice, in no small measure due to the influence of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1116-17. While this doctrine allows arbitrators to determine 
their own jurisdiction (either concurrently or prior to a court determination), a court will 
always have the final word on the issue—typically on a de novo basis. Id. at 1123. Even 
French law, which is perhaps the most extreme in granting arbitrators the “first” decision 
regarding jurisdiction. Id. at 1124-27; Richard W. Hulbert, Institutional Rules and Arbitral 
Jurisdiction: When Party Intent is Not “Clear and Unmistakable,” 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 
545, 565-66 (2009) (providing for subsequent judicial review on the question of whether the 
parties formed a valid arbitration agreement).  
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under the FAA, the parties to an arbitration agreement could not accomplish 
a similar result, in effect contractually granting the arbitrators the power to 
decide their own jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court appeared to 
answer, in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,305 that parties could do 
exactly that.306 The parties could ask the arbitrators to decide the 
jurisdictional question307 in the same manner they could ask the arbitrators to 
decide any other question, such as the merits of their dispute.308 While 
seemingly a straightforward exercise of party autonomy to refer a dispute to 
arbitration, this decision raised a host of questions.309 If the basis of the 
arbitral tribunal’s power to decide its own jurisdiction is no different than its 
power to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute, as the Court suggested,310 
then the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction is subject to review only under the 
standards of FAA section 10, which does not include any reference to the 
lack of an agreement to arbitrate.311 As such, the arbitral tribunal would not 
only have the power to decide its own jurisdiction, but would have the 
exclusive, and largely non-reviewable, power to do so.312 At the very least, 
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 514 U.S. 938 (1995). 
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 See id. at 943. This answer was by no means self-evident, as section 4 might also 
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 It was not at all clear that the Court intended such a result, but the Court’s language 
certainly suggested this possibility. 
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the Court had seemingly provided for contractually agreed upon competence-
competence,313 so long as the parties’ intent was “clear and unmistakable.”314 
The Court’s opinion in First Options undoubtedly led to a number of new 
drafting ideas with respect to arbitration agreements, two of which are 
particularly relevant for our analysis here. 
First, a number of United States arbitral institutions have included 
provisions within their domestic rules giving the arbitral tribunal the power to 
determine its own jurisdiction.315 Of course, one might seriously question 
whether an arbitration agreement including a set of rules, within which the 
arbitral tribunal was granted the power to decide its own jurisdiction, could 
possibly amount to “clear and unmistakable” intent to consign this issue to 
the arbitrators.316 However, a substantial majority of federal courts dealing 
with the issue have had little difficulty finding such consent in exactly this 
manner.317 In effect, a contractual version of competence-competence is 
arguably becoming the norm within the United States, notwithstanding its 
omission in the FAA. However, it is worth noting the obvious at this stage. 
The arbitrators’ authority to decide their own jurisdiction is based solely on 
whether the parties agreed to arbitration in the first instance. Thus, any grant 
of such authority is arguably fundamentally flawed, as a matter of contractual 
consent, based on its inherent circularity. Perhaps even more importantly, the 
arbitrators’ decision may be virtually unreviewable under FAA section 10, 
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 If granted by the parties, the arbitral tribunal would have the power to determine its 
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 First Options, 514 U.S. at 944. 
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 See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND 
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 See, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208-09 (2d Cir. 2005); 
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under the AAA Rules, including Rule 7); Mark Berger, Arbitration and Arbitrability: 
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Comment, Casually Finding the Clear and Unmistakable: A Re-Evaluation of First Options 
in Light of Recent Lower Court Decisions, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 443, 467-70 (2007). 
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unless perhaps the parties also contracted for heightened judicial review. This 
is where the second new idea came into play. In order to alleviate any 
concerns a court might have that an arbitrator’s decision might be 
unreviewable, parties inserted contractual provisions for subsequent judicial 
review.318 
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,319 the problems with contractual 
competence-competence were squarely presented. The Rent-A-Center 
contract executed by its employee, Jackson, included a provision in the 
arbitration agreement itself, clearly and unmistakably assigning to the arbitral 
tribunal the authority to decide any and all questions related to its 
jurisdiction, including the question of whether the parties had concluded a 
binding arbitration agreement—and assigning this decisional authority on an 
“exclusive” initial basis, though still subject to later judicial review.320 Not 
surprisingly, Rent-A-Center relied on First Options in arguing that this 
provision was fully enforceable and the initial jurisdictional question was 
solely and exclusively for the arbitrators to decide.321 In effect, Rent-A-
Center took the Court at its word in First Options and drafted an arbitration 
agreement seeking to take full advantage of the Court’s dicta. 
Jackson asserted an unconscionability defense to the purported arbitration 
agreement322 and, more importantly for the issue before the Court, wanted 
this issue decided by a court under FAA section 4, and not by an arbitrator.323 
Jackson pointed out the obvious flaws in First Options applied to these 
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 At least this was the thinking before the Supreme Court decided Hall Street Associates 
v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
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 See Brief for the Petitioner at 4-5 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) 
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 Id. at 10-11. 
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circumstances. The arbitrators’ authority to determine jurisdiction could not 
logically rely on the very agreement that Jackson was contesting as uncon-
scionable.324 This would amount to a classic example of circularity.325 
Moreover, surely such circular reasoning could not serve as the basis for 
granting the arbitrators the “exclusive” authority to make this determination. 
As presented, this case seemed to require the Court to either: (1) follow 
the First Options dicta to its logical conclusion, enforcing the parties’ 
contractual delegation of competence-competence to the arbitrators or (2) 
explain that the court did not really mean precisely what it said in First 
Options. Interestingly, Jackson suggested a way the Court might limit the 
dicta in First Options, arguing that the Court merely stated that the parties 
could grant the arbitral tribunal the authority to determine the “scope” of their 
arbitration agreement, provided the parties actually had an enforceable 
arbitration agreement in the first instance.326 However, Jackson argued, the 
latter issue was necessarily one for the courts—no matter what the parties’ 
agreement said.327 In a 5-4 decision, the Court took the first course and did 
so, in large part, by relying on the doctrine of separability.328 The case nicely 
illustrates the fundamental problem of circularity associated with contractual 
competence-competence. 
Separability and competence-competence represent distinct, but related, 
doctrines.329 Competence-competence provides the arbitrators with the power 
to decide threshold jurisdictional issues, while separability ensures the 
viability of the tribunal’s decision on the substantive dispute assigned to it—
assuming it determines that it has jurisdiction to decide the substantive 
dispute in question.  
For all of its continuing controversy,330 the Supreme Court’s original 
decision to embrace separability in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin 
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Manufacturing331 was arguably an unremarkable, and entirely necessary, 
extension by implication of section 2 of the FAA.332 Section 2 makes 
enforceable an agreement to resolve a contractual dispute by arbitration, and 
parties subject to contractual claims will often raise traditional contract 
validity defenses such as duress, mistake, fraud, or unconscionability. The 
defenses are often raised as a matter of course, and they are also frequently 
intertwined with the merits of the dispute referred to arbitration. Thus, if the 
arbitral tribunal could not effectively decide these questions, the entire 
arbitral process would almost certainly be subject to lengthy delays, and the 
agreement to arbitrate would often be rendered ineffective.333   
Two simple examples illustrate the importance of the doctrine of 
separability to an effective arbitration regime. In each case, A brings an 
action against B for breach of a contract that includes an arbitration 
agreement. B raises a defense of mutual mistake, asserting that the contract is 
therefore voidable.334 Under the doctrine of separability, the arbitral tribunal 
is empowered to decide this defense, without any effect on the arbitration 
clause contained within the potentially voidable main contract. Without 
separability, in example one, a court might decide this defense. However, this 
would essentially resolve this particular case, and the parties would be 
deprived of their contractual agreement to arbitrate the dispute. Still without 
separability, in example two, an arbitrator might go ahead and try to decide 
the parties’ dispute. However, the arbitrator could only issue an enforceable, 
preclusive decision in one direction—that of denying B’s defense. If the 
arbitrator decided in favor of the defense, he or she would also necessarily 
have to acknowledge the lack of any remaining jurisdiction to do anything 
but send the parties away without resolving their dispute. Separability, of 
course, resolves this very important practical problem—albeit with an 
admitted bit of theoretical “sleight of hand”—by allowing the arbitrator to 
decide the parties’ dispute, including any invalidity defense involving the 
main contract and to do so in favor of either party in an enforceable, pre-
clusive award.335 
                                                                                                                         
years later, to describe the Court’s decision in Prima Paint as “‘fantastic’” and “likely err-
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In Rent-A-Center, the parties’ arguments largely centered over the 
interpretation of the First Options dicta: was “delegation” largely limited to 
scope (or, perhaps, other similar issues) or did “delegation” include the 
question of whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate anything at all? The 
dissent suggests that the majority announced a rule not advocated by either 
party,336 and at least one commentator seems to agree.337 However, the 
majority’s decision in Rent-A-Center is arguably nothing more than an 
inevitable result of a literal reading of First Options taken to its logical 
conclusion, including the necessary application of the doctrine of sep-
arability. 
In First Options, the Court stated that the parties could delegate questions 
regarding jurisdiction (or, in the Court’s vernacular, “arbitrability”) to the 
arbitrator, including the questions of whether the parties had agreed to 
arbitration at all or whether the dispute in question fell within the scope of 
that agreement.338 In doing so, the Court explained that the parties’ 
agreement to delegate these jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrator was the 
equivalent of an agreement to delegate decisions regarding their dispute on 
the merits, and was subject to the same standard of review as a decision on 
the merits—that contained in section 10 of the FAA.339 
Taken at face value, the dicta from First Options said, quite clearly, that 
the parties could delegate jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrator, whose 
decision on the issue would be equally final to that of a decision on the 
merits—as long as this delegation is “clear and unmistakable.”340 Thus, 
unless the Court was prepared to ignore or, in some way, “refine” its earlier 
First Options dicta, its decision in Rent-A-Center was virtually a foregone 
conclusion; the question of whether Jackson’s agreement to arbitrate might 
be unconscionable and, therefore, invalid had been “clearly and 
unmistakably” delegated to the arbitrator. 
What apparently surprised some,341 including the dissenters,342 was the 
majority’s application of the doctrine of separability under these cir-
cumstances. However, if the parties’ delegation of the question of jurisdiction 
                                                 
336
 See Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2782 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
337
 See Cross, supra note 15.  
338
 First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-45 (1995); see also Barcelo, 
supra note 241, at 1133 (explaining the rebuttable presumption against the former and 
contrasting it with the presumption in favor of the arbitrator’s power to determine the latter). 
339
 First Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (1995). 
340
 Id. at 944. 
341
 See, e.g., Cross, supra note 15. 
342
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to the arbitrator is no different from their “delegation” of their dispute on the 
merits, then the majority’s approach seems quite logical. The “delegation 
provision” is separable from the arbitration agreement in exactly the same 
manner that the arbitration agreement is separable from the main contract, of 
which it often forms a part.343 Moreover, this application of the doctrine of 
separability is fully consistent with its purpose, as explained above. Absent 
the doctrine of separability, the arbitrator would be empowered only to make 
a positive decision on jurisdiction pursuant to the “delegation” clause, 
because a negative decision would deprive the arbitral tribunal of its 
jurisdiction on the “delegation” question, thereby negating the preclusive 
effect of any decision. 
The problem with the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center does not lie in its 
application of separability in that case. Instead, the problem arises from the 
First Options dicta and the entire notion of contractual competence-comp-
etence, which the majority in Rent-A-Center simply applied as written. 
As mentioned earlier, the arbitration agreement at issue in Rent-A-Center 
included a provision for expanded judicial review of any decision of the 
arbitrators.344 However, this provision is almost certainly ineffective today 
based on the Court’s decision in Hall Street, strictly limiting judicial review 
to the very narrow grounds provided in FAA section 10.345 Thus, if Rent-A-
Center and Hall Street are read together, as written, they clarify that the 
arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction will be final, subject only to review under 
section 10, which does not include any review of whether the parties 
concluded a valid arbitration agreement.346 The arbitrator’s decision is, 
essentially, unreviewable—at any stage—under the Court’s interpretation of 
contractual competence-competence.347 
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Taken at face value, this result seems bizarre, though such a perspective 
is admittedly affected by one’s own subjective lens. However, the result is 
objectively and quite clearly inconsistent with the standards for enforcement 
of international arbitration awards under the New York Convention. The 
Convention provides for recognition of arbitration agreements, unless a court 
finds “said agreement is null and void,”348 and provides for enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards, subject to an exception where a court finds the 
parties’ “[arbitration] agreement is not valid.”349 As explained in Part 
II.A.3.a, the New York Convention applies to a variety of non-domestic 
agreements and awards and is also the legal instrument through which awards 
rendered in the U.S. are typically enforced abroad.350 This inconsistency 
between FAA section 10 and the New York Convention creates a very real 
possibility that an award that is not subject to “vacation” under section 10 
might nonetheless be unenforceable under the New York Convention. Such 
inconsistencies can easily be avoided by simply ensuring the statutory 
grounds for vacation of an award mirror those for non-enforcement, and also 
reflect those for judicial recognition of an arbitration agreement351—an 
approach taken in the vast majority of modern arbitration statutes, but largely 
ignored in the implementation of the New York and Panama conventions 
under the FAA. 
The purpose of an arbitration agreement is to avoid court proceedings in 
resolving any dispute arising from the parties’ commercial relationship. An 
arbitrator’s decision on such issues is necessarily protected from subsequent 
scrutiny in order to give effect to the parties’ bargain for an efficient and final 
resolution of their dispute—without going to court. However, these same 
principles are misplaced when the issue is whether the parties ever agreed in 
the first instance to arbitrate anything. In this latter case, a court must—at 
some point—have an opportunity to determine whether the parties in fact 
gave up their right to judicial process. The statutory doctrine of competence-
competence provides for efficiency in allowing an arbitrator to make this 
determination, while also ensuring the availability of meaningful judicial 
review at some point in the process. The same cannot be accomplished 
                                                                                                                         
exactly the same legal principles as an agreement to arbitrate the merits of the parties’ 
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through the Supreme Court’s efforts to create a contractual form of 
competence-competence—at least not as currently articulated.352 
Any attempt to address competence-competence through arbitral rules is 
subject to the same deficiencies as an express agreement by the parties. Even 
if sufficient to constitute “clear and unmistakable” consent, the effect of such 
consent amounts to a final and absolute delegation of the issue, without 
meaningful judicial review. Nor can state law effectively provide for comp-
etence-competence, inasmuch as the issue is unequivocally one governed by 
“‘substantive federal arbitration law.’”353 
The doctrine of competence-competence is central to modern commercial 
arbitration and is arguably an absolute necessity for any modern statute. It 
cannot be effectively invoked by contract. Instead, an effective competence-
competence regime must be a part of the statutory background,354 invoked 
not by the terms of the parties’ disputed arbitration agreement, but by the 
very existence of such a dispute brought to the attention of the arbitral 
tribunal. It must also be subject to meaningful judicial review, whatever the 
timing of such review. Many important arbitral doctrines can be invoked by 
either private rules or by the law governing the arbitration. However, comp-
etence-competence must come from the underlying legal regime. Neither 
party autonomy, nor private rules, nor state arbitration law can reasonably 
serve as a substitute. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The time has come to jettison the aged and arcane U.S. Federal 
Arbitration Act. It has fully served its original purpose of making arbitration 
agreements enforceable355 and now serves only as a giant “black hole” into 
which the courts pour more and more decisions and into which parties to 
arbitration agreements—agreements expressly intended to avoid courts—
pour more and more of their money. The only fully functional way to provide 
an effective set of default rules for arbitration agreements is to do so with a 
new, comprehensive, modern arbitration statute, and the most efficient way 
to do this is with a single statute governing all commercial arbitration—
whether domestic or international—that fully comports with modern global 
standards.356 This is not to suggest that Congress should simply adopt, in 
total, any particular model or national law, but simply that the time has come 
to draft a modern statute to govern arbitration in the United States, and we 
can learn much from those who have already considered and adopted such 
statutes. 
In commenting on a series of conference presentations, Professor 
Carbonneau recently observed that the presentations on international 
commercial arbitration were generally less controversial and more cogent 
than those on domestic arbitration, which had focused on disparate party 
arbitration—the most controversial aspect of U.S. arbitration law.357 He 
further noted that “arbitration in the transborder context has thus far escaped 
being mauled by the claws of politicalization [and] is vital to global 
commerce ….”358 If we can somehow separate commercial, business-to-
business arbitration—both domestic and international—from the political 
morass of disparate party arbitration,359 then we should be able to find 
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common ground in developing and adopting a modern federal arbitration 
statute to govern this dispute resolution mechanism so vital to U.S. 
commerce—both at home and abroad. 
 
 
